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THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88

1

W

ith Iran's willingness,2 as of late 1988 and early 1989, to negotiate a
ceasefire on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 598,3 an initial
conclusion might be that the end of hostilities in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war also
ended US and European security interests in the Persian Gulf. France withdrew
the aircraft carrier Clemenceau and other naval units in September 1988. The
United States adopted a more wait-and-see attitude but also began to reduce its naval commitment by stopping convoying while remaining in the Gulf to provide a
"zone defense.,,4 Kuwaiti tankers' "deflagging" began in early 1989,5 and in March
1990 the last US Navy minesweepers were brought horne. "[R]eturn of the wooden
ships was in response to a reduced mine threat and will not affect continuing ... operations by US naval vessels aimed at maintaining freedom of navigation and the
free flow of oil through the Persian Gulf," a press release said in May 1990.6
Despite these encouraging trends, that war's end did not terminate security interests in the Gulf, particularly for the United States, Western Europe and Japan.
The war was but a warmer chapter in the struggle of national security interests for
control or influence in Southwest Asia and petroleum, that region's vital resource.
The Gulf area has a very large proportion of world oil reserves, about 54-60 percent? Two years later, the 1990-91 Gulf War between Iraq and the Coalition again
demonstrated the relationship between oil and national security interests. 8
This Chapter begins with an historical overview, followed by analysis of
great-power involvement, particularly that of the United States, in the Iran-Iraq
war at policy and strategic levels.
This work cannot consider in depth other aspects of the war's impact on other
national security interests-e.g., the USSR incursion into Afghanistan,9 which
Iraq condemned;10 a Soviet port arrangement with Syria in 1988; Iran-US bilateral relations from the Shah's fall in 1979 through the embassy hostage crisis,
which Iraq also condemned,l1 to claims in the Iran-Contra Affair; 12 the rise ofIslamic fundamentalism, particularly in Iran; 13 OPEC as an influence; the land war,
with renewed use of poison gas and missile attacks on cities,14 despite internationallaw to the contrary; 15 or even an apparent shift in Soviet foreign relations at
the time16-all of which (and more) impacted the war and security interests in the
Gulf. These additional factors are recited, without extended analysis, to confirm
the point that national security interests in one vital area cannot be seen in a
vacuum.
The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Part A. Prologue
There have been many actors 17 in the Persian Gulf: France, introduced to the
Middle East in 1916 afterthe Sykes-Picot agreement, when Syria became a French
mandate;18 Great Britain, whose influence dates from the early nineteenth century; Iraq, independent since 1932 after time as a British mandate and free of British influence since 1954, having been part of the Ottoman Empire before World
War 1;19 Iran, formerly Persia and more or less independent during the last two
centuries;20 the United States, whose oil companies have had interests there during this century and which assumed the mantle of providing naval security when
British forces withdrew in 1971; and countries that formed the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) in 1981,21 i.e., Bahrain,22 Kuwait,23 Oman,24 Qatar,25 Saudi
Arabia26 and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The UAE is a federation of the
former Trucial States-Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras-al-Khaimah,
Sharjah, Umm-al-Qawain-and came into existence December 1, 1971, when
Britain left the GulfP Before World War I the Ottoman Empire was sovereign
over some territories that became the GCC States, e.g., Saudi Arabia, while Britain
was protector of others, e.g., Kuwait and the Trucial States.

1. The United Kingdom and France; UK Interventions and Reactions.
Britain's strategic interests evolved around oil and air routes to India; it dictated defense and foreign relations policy to Iraq and western shore Gulf States,
later GCC members, except Saudi Arabia, which with Iran were always outside the
UK orbit. Britain exercised considerable influence over Iran, however. 28 In July
1946, for example,H.M.S. Norfolk and Wild Goose were ordered to Basra, Iraq, after
the USSR-backed Tudeh Party fomented rioting at the UK-owned oil refinery at
Abadan, Iran. In August 1946 UK troops landed in Basra. Although intervention
in Iran was not necessary, the "eventual outcome was satisfactory to British interests and entailed a setback to the growth of Soviet influence" in Iran. 29 On June 26,
1951 several Royal Navy warships were ordered to Abadan, Iran, to protect British
subjects during a UK dispute with Iran over nationalization of an oil refinery;
these ships conducted an evacuation October 3, 1951.30 In 1961 Britain landed
Royal Marines and troops, with a naval concentration offshore, to help deter an
Iraqi invasion of newly independent Kuwait. Arab League troops later replaced
UK ground forces. Still later Iraq recognized Kuwaiti independence.31 For a century and a half, the Gulf had been a "British lake," but times were changing. 32
France continued to have close ties with Iraq, however. 33
Evidence of the rise of other forces in the area was demonstrated in 1969 when
Iranian warships successfully escorted an Iranian merchantman from Khorramshahr
in the Shatt aI-Arab to the Gulf, defying Iraqi threats to stop any Iran-flagged vessel from sailing through Iraq-claimed waters. In 1961 Iran had bowed to a similar
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threat, but naval action now secured her purposes. 34 As Iran perceived the Soviet
threat diminishing to her north, she began to focus on her security interests in the
Gulf. 35 Iran began to assert offshore rights to areas where oil reservoirs were
known to exist and pushed territorial sea claims outward into the Gulf. Eventually
agreements were reached, except in the upper Gulf, where Irani, Iraqi and Kuwaiti
claims remained unresolved until 1975.36 After diplomatic interventions in London and a plebiscite in Bahrain overwhelmingly rejecting union with Iran, Iran
dropped sovereignty claims to Bahrain. 37 Saudi Arabia has asserted territorial
claims to parts of Abu Dhabi, a UAE member, and Dhofar, part of Oman, and the
Khufu strip, disputed with Qatar. Occasionally these disputes would spill over
into adjacent Gulfwaters, e.g., in 1968 when an Iranian gunboat approached and
detained an Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO) crew on an oil rig
claimed to be on the Iranian side of waters said to be Iran's for oil exploitation under a Iran-Saudi tentative agreement. 38

2. The United States; Preliminary Gambits in the Gulf.
US interests began with oil investments in the area, particularly an exclusive
concession in Saudi Arabia, later shared with the Saudis, that became ARAMCO.
After World War II US and others' investments gave returns in billions of US dollars annually; US Gulf area concessions stood at half the total of arrangements
there. 39 In the 1970s, however, Saudi Arabia nationalized ARAMCO and other
foreign holdings. Following on World War II cooperative arrangements, the
United States built an airfield at Dhahran (1945-62) and homeported its minuscule Middle East Force,40 under US Central Command (CENTCOM) during the
Tanker War, in Bahrain.41 Britain's 1971 withdrawal, while minimal in terms of
UK security forces and interests, had a profound impact on western Gulf States:
[UK] withdrawal from the Gulf was more substantial in political terms since it
necessitated the formulation of an independent political framework for the small
emirates along the Arab littoral, but the real impact was ... psychological. Britain had
served as judge, arbiter, administrator, and ... protector of this littoral for well over a
century. Departure in 1971 was tantamount to removal of the safety net. . . .
[C]urrents of nationalist and modernist sentiments and ideas had begun to circulate
along the shores of the Gulf even before the influx of oil revenues.42

Some local rulers did not favor UK withdrawal,43 for the obvious reason oflosing
support,44 and perhaps to fend off neighbors. 45
The United States did not rush into power the vacuum. Reeling from Vietnam
and responding to a USSR-Iraq friendship treaty,46 the Nixon Administration
developed the Twin Pillars policy of military assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iran47
to protect common regional security interests as part of the Nixon Doctrine. The
United States would no longer assume direct responsibilitY' for preserving
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worldwide security but would strengthen regional actors to playa primary role in
assuring stability. "Benign inaction" characterized US policy, 1971-79.48 The
United Kingdom saw the Iraq-USSR treaty as more apparent than real, although
France adhered to a view closer to that of the United States.49
In the northern Gulf, there was no benign inaction. Iran-Iraq relations were
strained, 1970-75, but in 1975 treaties to confirm land and water boundaries
seemed to patch up differences. 50 Thus matters stood until Iran's Shah fell in 1979.
Perhaps an omen for the future had occurred in 1971, the day of British withdrawal, when Iran occupied Greater and Lesser Tunb islands belonging to the
UAE's Ras Al Khaimah principality. That same day, pursuant to treaty, part of
Abu Musa island, belonging to the UAE's Sharjah principality, was given to Iran
for a military base in return for a grant to the Sharjah ruler. Sharjah and Iran would
share oil concession revenues. All three islands lie at the mouth of the Gulf, near
the Strait ofHormuz. Iraq retaliated against Iranian interests, and Libya retaliated
against Britain, which did not intervene as in 1961.51
3. The Soviet Union.
The USSR was seen as "eager to exploit the opportunities created by the ...
[1980-88] war [when it came] and the perception offaltering US interest to insert
themselves into the Gulf-a region in which their presence [had] traditionally
been limited and marginal.,,52 A Soviet naval flotilla had been on permanent station in the Gulf since March 1968, two months after the UK's notice that it was
quitting the area. 53 The USSR and Iraq had signed a Treaty of Friendship &
Co-Operation in April 1972, but Soviet relations with Iraq, 1972-80, have been
characterized as "cordial but far from a patron-client arrangement.,,54
4. Worldwide Dependence on Persian Gulf Oil and Foreign-Flag Shipping.
This shift in political balances was accompanied by increasing worldwide dependence on Gulf oil and, for the United States at least, relying on lift of oil in ships
flying other nations' flags. At the beginning of the Gulf War Europe imported
about half ofits oil (France, 70 percent; Italy, 60 percent; and other States smaller
percentages).55 While US 1973-85 Gulf oil import percentages fell through efficiencies, domestic oil production peaked, and by 1985 US oil companies saw the
United States in a dangerously vulnerable position vis-a-vis OPEC oil. Western
Europe received 20-40 percent, and Japan about 60 percent, of its oil from the
Gulf.56 By 1987 US dependence on Gulf oil had doubled from 1985, Western Europe's consumption of Gulf oil was about 33 percent of its total, Greece's was 50
percent, and Turkey's and Japan's nearly 66 percent. US domestic oil production
continued to decline. Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, had tremendous
advantages in oil reserves and surplus production capacity.57 Saudi oil supplied
half of France's needs, and other European States had large investments in the
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country. When the war began Iraq supplied considerably more oil to Britain,
France, Germany and Italy than Iran. 58 Even at war's end, when oil-dependent
countries had begun to tap other sources, the Gulf supplied a fourth of petroleum
moving in international commerce. Thirty percent of Western Europe's, and 65
percent of]apan's, oil came from the Gulf. The United States was 50 percent dependent on foreign oil sources, but only 18 percent of that or 9 percent of total consumption, came from the Gulf. 59
By 1986, US-flag foreign trade tankers were almost nonexistent; their role had
been taken by other nations' vessels, particularly those flying flags of convenience
but often beneficially owned by US business interests. The US foreign trade outlook was then also poor. 60 Contrasted with the US-flag fleet's steady demise and
growth of flags of convenience, the State-run USSR merchant fleet continued to
rise. In 1985 its tonnage was well ahead of that of the United States. With Soviet
satellites and clients counted, the USSR was third in world shipping tonnage (25
million), behind Liberia, Panama and Greece and ahead of the United Kingdom. 61 The Suez Canal closure during the Arab-Israeli wars prompted building
ever larger tankers, which could be operated more cheaply than smaller ones, but
which might have greater economic consequences and effects for the environment, ifa ship were damaged or sunk in a grounding or collision, or in a storm. The
same result would obtain ifthese huge ships were damaged during armed conflict.
5. The Environment.
The environment became another important factor. The UN Environment
Programme, developed after the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment,62 resulted in many regional treaties, among them the Kuwait Regional
Convention and Protocol (1978).63 By 1981 it was in force for eight Gulf States,
Iran and Iraq among them. 64 The UN LOS Convention, negotiated during the decade before signature in 1982, restated many principles ofthe 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, added new terms and published maritime
environmental standards. The Gulf is particularly environmentally sensitive because of heavy tanker traffic and offshore petroleum production activity. The
Gulfs currents are slow, there is only a gradual exchange of water, and therefore
little purgation of pollution once it happens. 65
6. Geography of the Persian Gulf.
The Persian Gulf, known as the Arabian Gulf to Gulf coastal States, is a shallow
extension of the Indian Ocean between the Arabian Peninsula to the west and Iran
to the east. It extends northeast 614 miles from the Gulf of Oman in the Indian
Ocean, through the Strait ofHormuz to the Shatt aI-Arab in the north. Iran borders it on the northeastern shore; Iran, Iraq (which has only a 10-mile coastline)
and Kuwait are on its northwest shores, and the island State of Bahrain, Kuwait,
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Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE border the Gulf on its southwestern shore and
around Oman's Musandam Peninsula to the Gulf of Oman and the Indian Ocean.
The Gulfis 24 nautical miles wide at its narrowest point in the Strait and about 200
miles across at its widest point. Like the Baltic and Black Seas the Gulf is shallow
with an average depth of 130-260 feet, with greatest depths of 700 feet within
Omani territorial waters in the Strait of Hormuz. There is no deep seabed in the
Gulf, whether considered from a geographic or law of the sea analysis. The shallowest areas, less than 120 feet, are along the UAE, where vessels over 5000 tons
displacement, i.e., nearly all of to day's tankers,66 can safely sail no closer than five
miles offshore. The Strait, only about 24 miles wide at its narrowest point, is relatively deep (210-270 feet) in its navigational channels. However, the Strait is dotted with islands claimed by littoral countries, Qeshen (Iran), Larak (Iran) and
Quoin Islands (Oman) at its narrowest point, and Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser
Tunbs, occupied by Iran. 67 Bahrain is an island nation, and there are other offshore islands around the Gulf, e.g., Bubiyan (Kuwait) and Kharg (Iran). Several
Gulf States, e.g., Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have numerous offshore
oil rigs or pumping stations. At the head of the Gulf, the Shatt aI-Arab (formed by
confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers) flows through a marshy delta into
the Gulf. There are also shallow estuaries elsewhere along the Gulf, where a pearl
industry flourished for centuries.68 The Shatt has been a boundary, albeit disputed, between Iran and Iraq. Kuwait lies just around the corner of the Gulf from
the Shatt marshes and Iran and Iraq. Like the Baltic and Black Seas, there is relatively little outflow or inflow from or to the Gulf. It is not as stagnant as the Black
Sea, but a pollution problem in the Gulf, whether deliberate, e.g., petroleum dumping during war or a terrorist attack, or accidental, e.g., in collisions or during war,
can have longterm consequences for the Gulf environment, not to mention freedom ofnavigation.69

7. Vital Shipping Chokepoints.
Yet another, and critically enduring, factor is that waters enclosing the Arabian
Peninsula have three of the world's most economically and strategically important
waterways: the Strait of Hormuz, entry for the Gulf; the Suez Canal and Bab EI
Mandeb Strait, entries and exits for the Red Sea, through which 10 percent of
world commerce flows. Suez and Bab EI Mandeb cut transit time dramatically for
merchantmen or naval forces moving between the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean; 70 closing the Canal during the Arab-Israeli wars forced travel around
Africa and promoted building larger petroleum tankers to supply the world. "The
... Gulf ... with the Strait of Hormuz, which gives access to it from the Gulf of
Oman and the Indian Ocean, might well be described as an international oil highway,,71 or "the West's lifeline," and a collision or terrorist attack in the Strait could
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have serious consequences.72 More than 80 tankers passed through Hormuz
daily.73 The number is less today.

Part B. The Course of the War and Others' Responses
The precipitating event for US involvement in the 1980-88 Gulf War was the
USSR invasion of Afghanistan and danger to the Gulfbecause of a power vacuum
there. 74 US President Jimmy Carter's January 23, 1980 State of the Union Address
treated the Gulf area as a vital American interest; he said the United States would
respond with force if necessary: "Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt
by any outside force to gain control of the ... Gulfregion will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States .. , and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.,,75 US naval task forces
were already in the Indian Ocean because of the Hostage Crisis; 76 they remained
there. The Carter Doctrine, as this point in the Address came to be called, promoted a basic rationale for prepositioning ships with stores for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) at Diego Garcia, a British Indian Ocean
dependency, and preparing for possible RDJTF deployment. 77 RDJTF was not
then a strong or mobile enough force to make it a serious US policy instrument,18
although its "jurisdiction" stretched over 19 countries, from Pakistan to Egypt to
Kenya, an area twice as large as the continental United States with nearly impossible lines of communication and some of the most inhospitable terrain on Earth.19
The other, unstated goal was protecting Saudi Arabia. The United States would respond "positively" to requests for assistance from "non-belligerent friends" in the
region. 80
Activist Iraqi Muslim Shiites, the dominant sect in Iran, tried to assassinate
Iraq's deputy premier in April 1980. Iraq began rooting out these activists, bombed
an Iranian border town, expelled Iranian residents and Iraqis ofIranian descent,
and called on Iran to vacate Abu Musa, Lesser and Greater Tunb, occupied by Iran
and formerly UAE territory. Iran began training infiltrators, and Iraq supported
important members of the Shah's government resident in Baghdad, who tried to
topple the Iranian government. Iraq sought and received backing from Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia, fearful ofIranian antimonarchial policy; according to Iran, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia signed secret agreements on September 12 to boost oil outputs considerably and to contribute sales revenues to Iraq's war effort. (Saudi
Arabia had signed an agreement with Iraq in February 1979, reportedly including
mutual security arrangements.) After border clashes in the summer of 1980, Iran
began shelling Iraqi towns in early September. Iraq demanded territorial cessions,
purportedly part of the 1975 settlement. 81
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1. 1980: Opening Moves; First Efforts at Ending the War.
On September 22 Iraq invaded Iran. 82 Two days later Jordan offered Iraq total
support, including arms bought from the USSR and Western powers. Jordan also
gave Iraq access to the Port of Aqaba and land and air facilities for imports and exports. 83 The war had begun. 84
On September 21 and 24 Iraq declared the 1975 agreement demarcating the
Shatt abrogated,85 asserting it would exercise full sovereignty over the Shatt. 86
Iraq required Iranian ships using the Shatt to engage Iraqi pilots and fly the Iraqi
ensign at the truck. Iran refused to do this. 87 When Iraq had invaded Iran on September 22 claiming self-defense,88 an Iranian Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) declared waterways near its coast a war zone, announced new shipping lanes after
ships passed Hormuz, disclaimed responsibility if vessels did not follow the lanes,
refused access to Iraqi ports, thereby closing the Shatt,89 and warned of retaliation
if Gulf States gave Iraq facilities. 90 Refusal of access to Iraqi ports was later characterized as a "blockade" of the Iraqi coast.91 There were also sporadic attacks on
shipping in the Shatt in the early days of the war. 92 Whetherthis resulted in pollution into the Gulf cannot be determined; undoubtedly there was spillage from
bunkers, tankers and damaged facilities. Attacking States' motivation and care, in
terms of concerns, if any, for the environment is not known.
On September 23 the European Community (EC) endorsed an Arab League appeal for a ceasefire and "emphasize[ d] the vital importance for the entire international community offreedom of navigation in the Gulf, with which it is imperative
not to interfere.,,93 From the beginning of the war until near the end, however, the
EC made no effort to harmonize policy, due to lack of internal cohesion and a clash
of cultnres. 94 Several Arab States, Libya and Syria among them, had supported
Iran in the League; Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, the Palestine Liberation Organization and South Yemen had boycotted the meeting. 95 Five days later the UN Security Council's Resolution 479 called for ending hostilities.96 Iraq, denying
territorial ambitions, accepted the Resolution; Iran considered the 1975 treaty
valid and demanded condemnation ofIraqi aggression. 97 Although the resolution
had not mentioned freedom of navigation, Japan and the United States stressed
that principle's primary importance.98 Resolution 479 also supported the UN Secretary-General's efforts to settle the dispute through mediation or conciliation,
and in November he appointed former Swedish Prime Minister OlafPalme as mediator; Palme's efforts were largely unsuccessfu1. 99
On October 1 Iran declared the Shatt closed for all maritime craft until further
notice. 100 On October 5 a US NOTMAR announced Iran had warned that "all
coastal waters [were] battle areas. All transportation of materials to Iraqi ports
[was] prohibited." After passing Hormuz, merchant traffic should stay south of
designated points. The Shatt estuary should be avoided, and mariners were cautioned to be alert to unusual, abnormal or hostile actions while in the Gulf. 101
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Iran's rationale for its war zone declaration was twofold, "the first being of a defensive nature.... Iran was [concerned with] protect[ing] its coastline against intrusion by ships likely to present a risk to national security.... [F]oreign ships
wishing to pass through the zone had to request prior authorization .... Ships calling at a port in ... [a] countr[y] bordering the ... Gulfwere, for obvious security
reasons, subject to stricter regulations," being required to contact Iran's naval
headquarters 48 hours in advance. "Iran's second concern was to guarantee the
safety of international shipping.... [T]he zone could be dangerous to shipping due
to warlike events likely to take place there. Without going so far as forbidding access to the zone, Iran ... recommend foreign ships to avoid the zone by following
shipping lanes outside it, thereby disclaiming responsibility for any damage
which might be incurred on passing through the zone. Thus warned ... , ships
which persisted ... did so attheir own risk.,,102 Iran began shuttling merchant convoys under naval protection down her coast, through Iraq's Gulf Maritime Exclusion Zone (GMEZ), to the lower Gulf. l03 According to an Iranian commentator,
"contrary to allegations, Iran never extended its war zone to ... Hormuz and, on 22
October ... , reaffirmed a commitment to keeping the Strait open to navigation.,,104 The United States later welcomed belligerents' assurances that Hormuz
would remain open. !Os Despite lapses in its threats to close the Strait,106 or its apparent use of others' territorial sea for naval maneuvers,107 there is clear evidence
to the contrary of a commentator's view that Iran's position in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) that produced the 1982 LOS Convention "remained faithful to monarchical Iran's worldview regarding the navigation
regime of the Gulf, most notably, opposition of a special regime for straits used for
international navigation ... , as well as insistence on prior authorization of warships intending to exercise innocent passage through the territorial sea.,,108
On October 7 Iraq declared the Gulf north of29 degrees 30 minutes North latitude "a prohibited war zone;" this was the Tanker War arena until 1984. !09 This
war zone declaration was reportedly reprisal, or retaliation, for the Iranian "blockade.,,110 By far the most severe blow to the Iraqi economy was Iran's successful closure of the Gulf, soon after hostilities began, to Iraqi oil exports. 111 Closing Iraq's
coast and Iranian bombing ofIraqi oil terminals forced Iraq to use pipelines to Kuwaiti, Saudi, Syrian and Turkish ports to export oil to finance the war, or to export
or import war-sustaining goods by other means, i.e., nearby third-State ports. The
result was that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia sold oil and turned over at least part of the
proceeds to Iraq as loans. They also made cash grants to Iraq.ll2 Estimates of Saudi
and Kuwaiti financial aid range from $25 billion to $65 billion. ll3 Although having sided with Iran early in the war, Syria allowed Iraqi oil exports through the
Kirkuk (Iraq)-Tripoli (Lebanon)-Banias (Syria) pipeline until 1982.114 During
the fall, "as reprisal for Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq," Iranian warplanes attacked
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Kuwaiti border posts and bombed the Um-Aish oil refineries, 25 miles below the
Iraqi border. us
Whether these were arms-length bargains, or these States acted out of fear of a
powerful neighbor, or otherwise, is less than clear.116 Bahrain, Qatar and the U AE
maintained strict official silence, although two UAE principalities (including Ras
Al Khaimah, which lost islands to Iran in 1971p710aned Iraq $1-3 billion by the
end ofl981, Abu Dhabi loaned $500 million a year by 1983, and Qatar loaned another $1 billion.11 s UK intelligence discovered Iraqi helicopters and troops in
Oman preparing to invade and occupy Abu Musa and the Tunbs; the UK and US
governments successfully pressed Oman to scuttle the Iraqi plan. Later, Saudi
Arabia persuaded Iraq to abandon the plan.11 9 Thus, at the beginning ofthe war
nearly all Gulflittoral States supported, or at least tilted toward, Iraq. Jordan had
solidly supported Iraq, opening the Port of Aqaba on the Red Sea for Iraqi civilian
and military imports. According to Iran, Jordan also permitted Iraqi use of an air
base. 120 This support was probably necessary for survival of the Iraqi regime, because Iranian bombardment ofIraqi Gulf ports early in the war made Iraq effectivelya landlocked country. By the end of 1980 its oil exports had dwindled from
over 3 million to 1 million barrels a day.121 Although officially neutral, Turkey
leaned toward Iraq.122 Nevertheless, perhaps 10 percent of Turkey's exports went
to Iran during the war and another 10 percent to Iraq.123 Egypt sold weapons to
Iraq and may have augmented the Iraqi army with mercenaries and volunteer detachments. Egyptian pilots took part in air raids on Iran. 124
Officially neutral, the United Kingdom improved relations with Iraq. France
was also neutral, but its policies favored Iraq.12S Private contractors in both countries signed deals with Iraq, and other States' arms dealers went through Iraq's oil
customers to supply Iraq arms and spares. 126 At the beginning of the war the
United States did not have diplomatic relations with either belligerent; US relations with Iran were bad because of the ongoing Hostage Crisis. On the other hand,
the USSR had relations with both and was in a less strained position with respect to
Iran, for which there had been historic Russian interest. Soviet aid to Iran stood at
$1 billion in 1980.127 By the end of the war the USSR had provided $8.8 to 9.2 billion in military assistance, most of it coming through Aqaba. 12S The initial Soviet
response to the invasion was strong disapproval, despite the 1972 Iraq-USSR
friendship treaty, and may have resulted in beginning Iraqi overtures to the
United States. 129 Italy's previously solid economic relations with Iraq were put
under pressure when it declared neutrality; Italy'S Fincantieri shipyard could not
then deliver 11 warships Iraq ordered as part of a $1.1 billion contract. Italian export licenses granted in 1981 lapsed because of the government's decision to ban
military exports to the belligerents. Iraq then refused to pay on its $2 billion debt to
Italy. Italian companies and Italian nationals also worked on Iranian construction
projects; this kept Italy from a high diplomatic profile. Italian businesses operated
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with both belligerents. The FRG maintained a more evenhanded approach.
Smaller northern European States not dependent on Gulf oil looked to the United
Nations to resolve the war. Spain and Greece, Gulfoil dependent, got all of it they
neededYO
The Islamic revolution left Iran in poor financial condition. As more skilled,
better educated and wealthy people fled, oil production declined, and foreign exchange reserves dwindled from $14.6 billion in 1979 to $1 billion in 1981. 131 However, Iran had military spare parts reserves, a legacy of the Shah's rule; 132 these
supplied its war machine for awhile. Syria and Libya supported Iran, airlifting
USSR-made arms to Iran; Syria provided intelligence. 133 Some private arms dealers in States officially leaning toward Iraq sold supplies to Iran. 134 Israel sold Iran
arms and spares from its stocks and got others from European sources. North Korea, East Germany and Cuba, eager to buy oil, sold Iran military supplies. 135 The
USSR, officially linked closely with Iraq, 136 may have sold war goods to Iran as
well, but Iraqi reverses in 1982 prompted promises of Soviet aid to Iraq.137 The
USSR was caught among three conflicting foreign policy issues: its relationship
with Iraq, an official amicable stance toward the Iranian revolution, and an international atmosphere marred by the Afghanistan invasion and tense US-Iran relations after the Hostage Crisis. The Soviet Union had declared its neutrality early in
the war, however. 138 The USSR appeared dissatisfied with Iraqi military action in
late 1980, and flirted with Iran and its friends, inter alia signing a Friendship
Treaty with Syria in October. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union did not totally abandon Iraq. Iraq, perhaps petulently, rejected arms from the USSR this time. Warsaw
Pact countries-Bulgaria, East Germany, Poland-increased arms sales to Iraq.
Early in the war Iran rebuffed a Soviet arms offer. Iran did get satellite information
on impending Iraqi attacks, however. 139 Iran was determined to be militarily
self-sufficient as part of the Islamic revolution. Iraq, on the other hand, relied increasinglyon Gulf State financial subventions, up to $18-20 billion by the end of
1981. Iraq also came to rely on the superpowers diplomatically too. 140
In November Iranian NOTMARs directed ships entering or leaving Iranian
ports to get coordinates for Gulf travel from its navy and to inform the relevant Iranian port of their position hourly. Inbound ships had to give estimated time of arrival at Bandar Abbas and be cleared. If not cleared, they were to anchor there.
Early in 1981 a NOTMAR directed all very large crude carriers or ultra large crude
carriers (VLCC or ULCC), not inbound for Iranian ports and intending to cross
the Iranian restricted zone, to contact Iranian naval headquarters with travel information 48 hours before departure,141 ostensibly for ship safety reasons. 142
"Although neither Iran nor Iraq declared contraband lists, the fact that both nations attacked neutral crude oil carriers, loaded and in ballast, indicated both ...
regarded oil as contraband. Whether classified as absolute or conditional contraband, oil and the armaments which its sale or barter on international markets
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[would] bring, were absolutely indispensable to the war efforts of the ... belligerents.,,143 No prize courts were established until the end of the war, when Iran
published its rules, which did not include a contraband list. l44
The UK Armilla Patrol was deployed in the Gulffrom the beginning;14S Gulf
States provided it and other western navies facilities. 146 Logistics sources limited
Patrol operations to the lower Gulf, up to 40 miles north of Dub ai, and outside war
zones; UK merchantmen steaming to Kuwait were not protected northward. 147 A
US guided missile cruiser was ordered to the Gulf in October; President Carter
wanted a naval task force presence to keep Hormuz open. 148 By October IS at least
60 Australian, French, UK and US warships were in the Indian Ocean to protect
the oil route; 29 Soviet vessels were also there. 149 US overall policy had these
themes:
(1) United States neutrality ...
(2) American expectation of neutrality and non-interference by other nations;
particularly the U.S.S.R.
(3) Defense of United States vital interests including:
(a) Preservation offreedom of navigation to and from the Gulf,
(b) Prevention of the war's expansion in ways that would threaten the region's security.
(4) A desire for the immediate cessation of hostilities and solution of the dispute
by diplomatic means.

These derived from US goals of peace and preventing a wider war. lSO The United
States had imposed economic sanctions on Iran when the Hostage Crisis began.
Some controls were revoked in 1981 after the hostages' return, others remained in
force, and more controls were imposed again in 1987 because of Iran's actions
against US flag vessels in the Gulf. lSl The United Kingdom had passed special legislation to permit Orders in Council to limit contracts related to Iran in early 1980,
and this legislation also remained in effect during the war. lS2
When the war began 70 neutral-flag vessels were trapped in the Shatto Despite
UN good offices in October 1980, including a plea for a ceasefire to allow them to
leave under a UN IS3 0r Red Cross flag,lS4 Iraq refused to allow it, citing its "full"
sovereignty over the Shatt. lSS Iran had accepted the proposal. l S6 The ships remained in the waterway for the rest of the war.
2. 1981: Efforts at Settlement; the Gulf States Organize the GCC.
In March 1981 the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) offered the belligerents a peace plan; they rejected it. lS7 UN mediation, which had begun in November, had failed by April. lS8
Between May and November 1981 Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia
and the UAE established the Gulf Cooperation Council under Saudi leadership with
French and UK advice, to effect coordination, integration and interconnection
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between member States to achieve unity among them. GCC members moved toward economic integration and defense and security coordination between 1981
and the end of the war. 159 The Council initially stressed economic and social planning, as is evident from its Charter, but security issues eventually emerged as the
GCC's primary focus. 160 The Council "consistently supported Iraq and repeatedly
called for cease-fire in the war, fully endorsing Security Council resolutions.,,161
Although the GCC tried to underline its neutrality, Iran may have seen its establishment as a step against it and the Islamic revolution. 162 However, one member,
UAE, pursued its special relationship with Iran; the GCC secretariat approved it to
maintain open, friendly communication with Iran. Even here there was ambivalence because of Iran's occupying Abu Musa and the Tunbs. 163 Similarly, although basically supporting Iraq, Kuwait felt pressure from Iran because of its
geographic proximity.164
Militarily, the GCe was weak, relative to the belligerents, except the Saudi air
force; the other five States mustered only 100,000 in their armed forces. 165 The
GCC was never totally unified, at least early in the war. For example, Qatar, because of a Saudi-Qatar dispute over the Khufu strip, withdrew forces from Peninsula Shield I, the first relatively modest GCC combined exercise. This action,
according to an Iranian commentator, reportedly "followed a succession of other
blows to attempts at constructing a common defense arrangement.,,166 Later Peninsula Shields (II, 1984; III, 1987), were more successful. For the first time in the
Twentieth Century, forces from all GCe States participated in cooperative military activities aimed at defending their territories. Although the war initially
posed a threat to GCe States, the end result was a stronger, more unified military
structure. In 1984 its Council decided on a rapid intervention force for peacekeeping operations in the Gulf area; in 1987 the Council approved a comprehensive security strategy, which may amount to a collective defense pact. 167 Nevertheless,
most Western analysts concluded during the war's early years that the narrow
military significance of any GCC measures would remain marginal. Council members, even if they acted in unison, were seen as lacking manpower and infrastructure to mount an adequate defense against a determined aggressor. Although the
GCC States could not stop a Soviet attack, they could increase the political and military costs of aggressive moves by regional States, e.g., Iran or Iraq, and thereby
serve as a deterrent. 168 GCC States also negotiated a web of bilateral internal security arrangements to combat subversion and terrorism. 169 The May 1981 GCC
summit in Abu Dhabi declared that the Gulf should remain free of international
conflicts and expressed fear offoreign intervention. Its November Riyadah conference expressed hope that efforts coming from the ICO, non-aligned States, and the
U nited Nations, would be successful. Thus the GCC came to emphasize the ICO as
a mediator between the belligerents. 170 Thus, early in the war, the GCC's significance and the emerging regional security framework was seen
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as an information-sharing network for ... contain[ing] ... internal subversion and
violence; as a wholly indigenous and domestically palatable framework for serious
and routine consultation with a view toward enhancing members' diplomatic
initiatives and deterrent capabilities against external aggression; and as a possible
venue for establishing more realistic, efficient, and compatible industrial plans in an
era of reduced income.

Much would depend on events in Iran and Iraq, however. I7l
Also in 1981, at Saudi request, US Air Force AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi
Arabia to enhance surveillance capabilities. In The incoming Reagan Administration saw the USSR as the major threat in the Gulf, a purported shift in US policy.I73 On Saudi advice, the Administration sent a special emissary to Baghdad in
April 1981, and Iraq announced in July that the head of the US interests section
would be treated as a de facto ambassador.I74 US military presence was to be increased, including assets prepositioning a Navy-Marine Corps task force, Army
and Air Force exercises, creation of the RDJTF, and efforts to get access to Indian
Ocean facilities. I75 A May 27 US NOTMAR repeated previous warnings and
Iran's revised shipping guidelines. I76
In May 1981 Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish vessel, Elsa Cat,
bound for the UAE and Kuwait and carrying military equipment to Iraq; Iraq
protested Elsa Cat's seizure. Both vessels were let go. Iran was careful at this time to
avoid provoking neighbors or major Western powers, being dependent on transshipments from the UAE and food imports through the Gulf. I77 In October an Iranian air raid damaged Kuwaiti Umm Aish oil installations. Beginning in 1981 and
continuing through 1984, Iraq attacked commmercial vessels in the northern
Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships calling at Bandar Khomeni or Bushire, Iran
after being convoyed through Iranian territorial waters. I7S In March 1982 it was
reported that Iraq had mined the Bandar Khomeni - port ofBan dar Mashahr channel to the open sea. An Iranian tanker had been lost in February, probably to
mines. I79 There are apparently no published reports of oil spillage and pollution,
or pollution from other cargoes or bunkers from these or later attacks, except for
the 1983 Nowruz attack. ISO However, it is safe to infer that there was spillage and
therefore pollution of harbors and offshore sea areas; the extent is unknown. The
minelayers' motivation and care in conducting these and later attacks is also unknown. In April 1982 Syria had shut off Iraq's oil pipeline access to the Mediterranean; Iraq could now only export oil through Saudi Arabia and a trans-Turkey
pipeline. lSI In 1984 the Turkish line was expanded; in 1987 a second leg was built.
Oil was also trucked across Jordan to the Port of Aqaba. This network, which
included a spur pipeline to Yanbu in Saudi Arabia, increased Iraqi export capacity
from 650,000 barrels a day in 1982, the low point during the war, to 2.5 million
barrels a day in 1987, or close to prewar output. IS2 Iran also realized the danger of

The War, 1980-88

47

lifting its oil through Gulf ports and planned a 1200-kilometer pipeline to J ask in
the Indian Ocean. I83
3. 1982: More Efforts at Peacemaking; Iraq's Maritime Exclusion Zone.
In May 1982 Iraq tried to invoke the Arab League mutual defense treaty to get
military aid from League members. Syria warned that if Egypt, a League member,
lined up with Iraq, Syria would go with Iran. The result was a political standoff. 184
Algerian attempts to mediate the dispute almost resulted in a breakthrough. I8S
The Gulf Cooperation Council's emergency meeting in April had declared support
for efforts to end the war, and its May emergency meeting had adjourned until May
30 to allow efforts, including those of the ICO, to end the war. When this effort collapsed, the GCC called on Iran to respond positively to Iraq's peace initiatives. For
the first time, the Council identified Iran as the intransigent party. The GCC repeated this call in July 1982. This year marked the GCC's awakening to shouldering its security responsibilities more forcefully. GCC defense ministers authorized
comprehensive cooperation in security affairs. I86 Peninsula Shield II was held in
1984, a result of these decisions. I87
InJune 1982 the GCC had offered a peace plan: ceasefire, withdrawal to the 1975
borders and negotiations on other issues. I88 In July and October Security Council
Resolutions 514 and 522 called for a ceasefire. I89 The UN Secretary-General reported Iraq was ready to cooperate in implementing Resolution 514, which also
called for UN observers to supervise a ceasefire and withdrawal. I90 Iran was not;
the next day uly 13, 1982) Iran launched the first ofmany offensives into Iraq, the
first real invasion of its adversary. 191 In September the Arab League urged ending
the war and complying with Council resolutions. I92 Iraq subscribed to this peace
plan, sponsored by Saudi Arabia; Iran rejected it,I93 demanding $150 billion in indemnity.I94 Even Saudi Arabia's private offer to pay $50 billion to Iran in indemnity was refused. I9S Israel's invading Lebanon in June also helped blow these
efforts off course. By late 1982 all Gulf States had policies of strict neutrality because of fear ofIran except Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which strongly favored Iraq.
Kuwait was fearful of its northern neighbor as well; Iraq continued to demand a
lease of Kuwait's Bubiyan Island at the Shatt's mouth. Saudi Arabia agreed to pay
for five Super Etendard fighters, sold by France to Iraq, in Saudi oil money. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia also guaranteed performance offoreign companies' defense
contracts with Iraq.I96 Observers claim Iraq could not have sustained its war effort
without the French deliveries. I97 The United States authorized sale of60 helicopters for "agricultural purposes" and $460 million ofcredits for American rice. 198
On August 12, 1982 Iraq had announced its GMEZ, advising it would attack any
ship within the zone and that tankers docking at Iran's Kharg Island, regardless of
nationality, would be targets. Khargwas Iran's main export terminal. I99 When announcing the GMEZ and "blockade" of Kharg, Iraq stressed that its war zones

a
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were designed to cope with difficulties in distinguishing between vessel nationalities in the Gulf. 200 On August 29 Iran responded, declaring it would protect
foreign shipping, began escorting foreigr. shipping, and deployed ships with surface-to-air missiles at Kharg. Iran began giving naval protection to shuttle convoys
of Iran-flagged and neutral flag merchantmen lifting oil from Iranian northern
Gulf ports to those farther down its shore for world export. Iraq attacked ships in
its GMEZ through September. The GMEZ was modified in November, Iraq
"ask[ing] all companies and owners of oil tankers that their vessels [would] be subject to danger upon entering the ... zone.,,201 In general, however, up to March
1984, Iraq attacked all ships in its GMEZ. 202 This aspect of the war was the only
theater where the initiative lay with Iraq.203 The US freedom of navigation policy
was redefined to keeping Gulf access open for nonbelligerents. 204 Contacts with
the United States increased, and in 1982 the United States removed Iraq from its
list of States supporting international terrorism,205 thereby opening a door for
more Iraq-US contacts, e.g., intelligence information and business. 206 The USSR
by now had receded from its initial disapproval ofIraq's invasion and began to increase supplies to Iraq, to the point where the Soviet Union underwrote most of
Iraq's 1987 defense effort. The USSR was primarily concerned with Iraq's survival; an Iranian military victory was not considered to be in the Soviet Union's
best interests. 207
The November 1982 Bahrain Gulf Cooperation Council summit focused on Iranian complicity in a failed coup in Bahrain, and "More than any other event, [it]
molded the GCC's view on how to react toward Iran." Although Saudi Arabia
failed to convince GCC members to help Iraq financially, it succeeded in identifying the Iranian Islamic Revolution as a threat to the GCC. After the summit GCC
defense ministers and others conferred to coordinate contingency plans for containing the war, i.e., to prevent spillover into theirterritories. These officials asked
Iran to respond to the ICO, UN and other peace missions; there was no response.
Given these rejections, the GCC decided to officially support Iraq.208 In January
1983 Iran, Libya and Syria issued a "Damascus Communique," condemning Iraq
and expressing support for Iran. GCC foreign ministers sent a strong rebuke, saying the Communique did not serve Arab unity and would not help end the war.
The 1983 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit urged a ceasefire appealing to
the United Nations to consider a peacekeeping force at the belligerents' borders. 209
4.1983: Assault on the Environment; The UN Supports Freedom o/Navigation.
On March 2,1983 Iraq bombed Iran's Nowruz offshore oilfield, causing an immense slick; previously it had bombed Kharg facilities.
Efforts to arrange a cease-fire ... to allow anti-pollution activities were unsuccessful,
and the persistent oil slick in a level of pollution which some experts believed would
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cause permanent damage to the Gulf ecosystem; ... by early June ... desalination
plants in Saudi Arabia had to be closed, while Dubai [one of the UAE] announced on
3 June that it had [imposed a ban] on all imports of fish from neighbouring Gulf
countries after the discovery that existing stocks had been contaminated by oil.

In some areas the oil was reportedly two feet thick. International shipping lanes
were threatened, since many vessels use sea water for cooling and distilling into
fresh water. Early reports that the slick had equalled the area of Belgium were later
discounted. Strong winds blew it offshore and partially dispersed it. Iraq rejected
Iran's request for a partial truce so that oil cappers could try to stop the 2000 to 5000
barrels a day flow. 210 (A merchantman's allision with a well on January 27 had
caused part of the spill.211) The United States may have been involved in helping
get the spill capped. 212 Iran characterized the attack as a clear violation of the Kuwait Regional Convention organization regulations which "strictly prohibit[ed]
military attacks on oil installations.,,213 Iraq countered that the conventions
"ha[d] no effect in ... armed conflict.,,214 The London-based War Risks Rating
Committee raised marine cargo insurance rates in 1982 and again in 1984 because
of Iraqi attacks on Gulfshipping. 2IS
In October the Security Council called for a ceasefire. Resolution 540 "Condemn[ed] all violations of international humanitarian law, in particular ... the
Geneva Conventions ofl949 in all their aspects, and call [ed] for the immediate cessation of all military operations against civilian targets, including city and residential areas[.]" The Resolution
..• Affirm [ed] the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters,
call[ed] on all States to respect this right and also call[ed] upon the belligerents to
cease immediately all hostilities in the region of the Gulf, including all sea-lanes,
navigable watenvays, harbour works, terminals, offshore installations and all ports
with direct or indirect access to the sea, and to respect the integrity of the other
littoral States.

The Council "Call[ed] upon both parties to refrain from any action that may endanger peace and security as well as marine life in the region of the Gulf.,,216 In voting
to approve Resolution 540, the USSR made it clear that it would firmly oppose
armed intervention in the Gulf for any reason, including freedom of navigation. 217
The Gulf Cooperation Council's fourth summit endorsed the resolution. The GCC
thus went on record, for the first time, to support freedom of navigation in the
Gulf. 2IS
On January 1, 1983 the US Central Command (CENTCOM) had been established to replace the RDJTF to plan and coordinate US military operations in the
region more effectively. France and Britain continued to maintain a substantial
Indian Ocean naval presence, with ships regularly sent there. 219 The USSR also
continued its Indian Ocean presence. President Reagan had reaffirmed and

50

The Tanker War

expanded the Carter Doctrine to include US interest in dealing with threats to
Saudi Arabia and readiness to keep the Strait open ifIran tried to stop shipping
there. US buildup continued.220 Operation Staunch sought to curtail the arms
flow to Iran. 221 US policy had changed in late 1983, following Iraqi officials' visit
to Washington, where they advised the United States that closing the Gulf to Iraqi
oil exports had hurt the Iraqi economy and that Iraq would have to increase the
cost of the war to Iran in order to press Iran to end it. 222 In December 1983 Iran
sought to revive the Regional Cooperation for Development Agreement with Pakistan and Turkey that the Shah had established in the 1960s. Pakistan and Turkey
received the overture cordially.223

5.1984: Attacks on Tankers and Other Shipping; Responses.
Perhaps presciently, the United States published this Notice to Airmen
(NOTAM) and NOTMARin January 1984:
A. u.s. naval forces operating in international waters within the ... Gulf, Strait of
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL [above ground level] ...
not cleared for approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid
approaching closer than five NM [nautical miles] to U.S. naval forces. It is also
requested that aircraft approaching within five NM establish and maintain radio
contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Aircraft which approach
within five NM at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to
U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.
B. This notice is published solely to advise that hazardous operations are being
conducted on an unscheduled basis; it does not affect the freedom of navigation of
any individual or State.... 224

Iran protested this and later "cordon sanitaires,,225 around US warships and aircraft, and US Navy ships transiting Iran's territorial sea during the war. 226 The
United States rejected the protests, asserting a right of self-defense.227 These
claims were seen as a hardening of positions between Iran and the United States.
The US official position was that Iran was refusing to end the war, and not Iraq,
which had accepted Resolution 540, and that Iraq attacked shipping in its GMEZ,
while Iran was hitting neutral vessels in international waters. By now 19 US warships, including a carrier, were in the Gulfarea. 228 Britain decided not to use an envelope around its Armilla Patro1. 229
In March 1984 the United States reportedly tried to persuade some Gulf States
to avoid a crisis by letting the United States use their military facilities and to allow
military supplies prepositioning in Bahrain, Oman and the UAE. The United
States had coordinated contingency plans with Great Britain for escorting tankers
and providing air cover in the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. US plans also
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reportedly included blockading Kharg Island, mining Iranian Gulf ports and
commando raids on Iranian bases. However, the United States insisted that it be
invited into the region and that any arrangement must involve Western allies. The
mission came to naught. 230 Part of the background for the US initiative may have
been Kuwait's claim that Iran had attacked Bubiyan Island, owned by Kuwait, and
Kuwait's complaint ofIranian hospitality to terrorists who hijacked a Kuwaiti airliner and escaped to Iran. 231
In February 1984 the Iraqi GMEZ had been extended to 50 miles around Kharg
Island; Iraq warned that ships approaching Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be
sunk. 232 Bandar Khomeni approaches had been mined the previous October. 233
Britain protested a March 1 Iraqi attack on a convoyed cargo ship, The Channing, in
the Bandar Khomeni approaches; Indian and Turkish vessels were also at234 The war was creeping down the Gulf. Tankers were hit in Iraqi air attacked.
tacks on Kharg, and Iraq destroyed Saudi tankers outside its GMEZ. Iran attacked
Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers, including a supertanker, Yanbu Pride, for the first time
in April and May 1984.235 Iraqi attacks were airborne, since the Iran "blockade"
had effectively bottled up Iraq's relatively weaker naval forces. 236 Iraq had shifted
its anti-shipping campaign focus in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran's war
economy and to arouse world interest in the conflict,237 perhaps to "draw in other
states, the Western powers in particular, in the hope that they would support Iraq
and help to bring about a peaceful settlement.,,238 Iraq had some success in disrupting Iranian oil exports; its attacks promoted third State measures designed to
protect their nationals' commercial interests. 239 In attacking mostly neutral-flag
tankers sailing independently,
Iraq appears to have devoted minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the
target before [launching missiles;] ... accidents ... did occur. Iran does not appear to
have begun attacking commercial shipping until Iraq commenced its anti-tanker
campaign .... Since there was no sea traffic with Iraq, Iran attacked neutral merchant
shipping destined to and from neutral ports ... , presumably ... to persuade Iraq's
financial backers, the other Gulf States, to dissuade Iraq from its campaign against
the Kharg Island tankers. Iran's attacks on merchant shipping were less numerous ...
and, in general, less costly in lives and property ... , [being] conducted with rockets
instead of missiles .... Iran devoted more effort to target identification than did
Iraq.... Iran did not conduct its attacks in declared ... zones[,] and some ... attacks
were ... in neutral territorial waters. 240
This expansion of the Tanker Warled the United States to grant a Saudi requestto
buy Stinger short-range air defense missile systems. 241 The USSR supplied Iraq
with weapons, consistent with its bilateral friendship and cooperation treaty, and
at the same time Soviet weaponry may have found its way to Iran through North
242
Korea and the PRe. Soviet arms sales seemed to follow the fortunes of the battlefield and Soviet failure to achieve influence within Iran. 243 France was becoming a
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heavy supplier to Iraq244 and in 1984 sold $4.5 million in arms to Saudi Arabia,245
which may have found their way to Iraq.246 Sweden began selling arms to Bahrain
but mostly to Iran through middlemen in Austria, Brazil, Ecuador, Singapore,
Thailand and Yugoslavia. Among these sales were 40 "pleasure cruisers," as designated by a Swedish manufacturer, to the Iranian coast guard. At the same time the
UN Secretary-General chose a Swedish politician who later became prime minister, OlafPalme, as mediator between the belligerents.247
The Tunis May 9-10 Arab League Summit Conference strongly condemned attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers. 248 The Soviet Union was concerned that Iranian attacks on the tankers would result in a major regional war on its borders and
a possibility of US intervention. Although the USSR negotiated with Iran in June
1984 concerning Soviet military support ofIraq, little changed in Soviet behavior,
which was becoming increasingly pro-Iraq, partly due to Iranian purges of pro-Soviet groups in Iran. 249
In April an Iraq-laid mine had damaged a Saudi tanker, and in May Iran initiated a retaliatory policy against Arab shipping. 250 On May 21 the GCC States complained to the Security Council about Iranian "acts ofaggression on the freedom of
navigation" to and from their ports, asserting that "Such acts of aggression constitute a threat to the stability and security of the area and have serious implications
for international peace and security.,,251 Iran justified the attacks on reaction
against aid to Iraq by States in the region, and "indivisibility of security in the ...
Gulf.,,252 Although this argument concededly had no basis in law, Iran hoped target States would pressure Iraq, whom they had been supplying,253 to stop attacks
on Iran. 254 During Council meetings many States addressed freedom ofnavigation .
. . . Norway ... expressed regret that ships had been attacked in international waters
outside the declared war zones, and stated that free and safe navigation should be
secured for international shipping in the area .... Kuwait said that attacks against
Saudi and Kuwaiti tankers were acts of aggression committed against ... two
countries ... not parties to the ... conflict, carried out in violation of ... conventions
according to which the high seas [were] open to all countries. This view was shared in
general terms by other Gulf States such as Bahrain, Oman, [UAE] and Saudi Arabia.
Yemen also denounced those attacks aimed against tankers belonging to States ...
not parties to the conflict. The importance of ... free navigation and free commerce
was further stressed by ... Ecuador, [FRG], India, Jordan, Liberia, Morocco,
Pakistan, Somalia and Sudan[.] ... Panama called on the ... Council to take action to
ensure that the right of free navigation and trade in international waters might be
effectively exercised by all .... [T]he Netherlands pointed out the legal aspects of the
attacks on shipping in the Gulf, recognizing that under international law belligerents
may ... restrict shipping to and from ports of ... belligerents, and that such measures
do of necessity affect the rights of third States under whose flags such shipping is
conducted; ... deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against merchant shipping in
any part of the Gulf were to be considered absolutely outside the scope of the
permissible use of armed force. The Soviet Union, ... restating that any foreign
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armed intervention in the ... Gulf was inadmissible, no matter what the pretext,
asserted that international law demand[ed] strict observance of ... freedom of
navigation, as laid down in general maritime law and in binding treaty obligations.
The other permanent members of the ... Council reaffirmed in rather general terms
the legitimate rights and interests of third States.255

The Arab League Secretary General also invited the Council to take appropriate
measures to protect navigation in the region and to ensure safety of international
sea lanes and channels. 256 Many States addressing the Council had vessels under
their registries, perhaps under flags ofconvenience (e.g., Liberia, Panama), or were
major carriers, in the Gulf trade. Many had been or would be major naval players in
the Tanker War. 257The resulting Resolution 552 Gune 1, 1984)
· .• Gall[ed] upon all States to respect, in accordance with international law, the
right of freedom of navigation; ... Reaffirm[ed] the right of free navigation in
international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and
installations of the littoral States that are not parties to the hostilities; ... Gall[ed]
upon all State to respect the territorial integrity of the States ... not parties to the
hostilities ... ; ... Gondemn[ed] the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and
from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia; .. . Demand[ed] that such attacks should
cease forthwith and that there should be no interference with ships en route to and
from States ... not parties to the hostilities; ... Decide[ed], in the event of
non-compliance with the present resolution, to meet again to consider effective
measures ... commensurate with the gravity of the situation ... to ensure the freedom
of navigation in the area ....258

A GCC draft resolution would have named Iran as an aggressor. 259 A week later the
London Economic Summit of major Western powers and Japan
· .. expressed [its] deep concern at the mounting toll in human suffering, physcial
damage and bitterness that this conflict has brought; and at the breaches of
international humanitarian law that have occurred.
· .. The hope and desire ... is that both sides will cease their attacks on each other
and on the shipping of other States. The principle of freedom of navigation must be
respected. \Y/e are concerned that the conflict should not spread further and we shall
do what we can to encourage stability in the region.
· .. We also considered the implications for world oil supplies .... [T]he world oil
market has remained relatively stable.... [T]he international system has both the
will and the capacity to cope with any foreseeable problems through the continuation
of the prudent and realistic approach ... being applied. 260

Almost simultaneously Saudi aircraft, with US AWACS help, downed an Iranian
figh ter over the Gulf after two warnings; there was a dispute as to whether it was in
international or Saudi airspace, but in any event Iran appeared unwilling to
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challenge the Saudis. Two weeks later Saudi Arabia established an Air Defense
Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Fahd Line, beyond Saudi territorial sea limits.
This allowed Saudi interceptors, guided by US AWACS and refuelled by US air
tankers, to engage other aircraft, primarily Irani, threatening shipping. 261 Saudi
Arabia also proclaimed a 12-mile safety corridor within the GCC States' territorial
sea. It was intended to provide security for neutral shipping carrying oil from Kuwait and other supporters ofIraq.262
At the same time, however, pragmatists within Iran tried to reassure GCC
States; a diplomatic breakthrough for Iran came a year later, in May 1985, when
the Saudi foreign minister paid an official State visit. There were also high-level
exchanges between Iran and Oman and the UAE. The one area where diplomatic
progress eluded Iran was the tanker war. Even here, for more than a year Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia tried to resolve differences through bilateral negotiations. The
Tanker War was not amenable to diplomatic solution between the Gulf Arabs and
Iran, because it was an Iraqi war policy. Iraq controlled the timing and intensity of
attacks on Iranian shipping and oil installations; with fewer operational aircraft
and weapons, Iran had to choose when and against whom to respond. Tankers carrying Kuwaiti oil became special targets ofIranian attacks because of all the GCC
countries, Iran had the least friendly relations with Kuwait, which was far weaker
militarily than Saudi Arabia. 263
During the summer of 1984 mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait
ofBab el Mandeb, choke points for the Red Sea to the west of Saudi Arabia, damaging several ships. Although Iran and Libya were accused oflaying the mines, Iran
denied the charges; it is thought that the Libyan cargo ship Ghat laid them. Egypt
exercised its right under the Constantinople Convention to inspect all shipping,
and a half dozen navies cooperated in locating and destroying the mines. Saudi
Arabia received US assistance in sweeping its ports ofJidda and Yanbu. 264
A UN -sponsored ceasefire in the land war supposedly lasted from June 1984 to
March 1985. The belligerents agreed to stop attacks on civilian population centers. 265 Iran proposed that the truce include Gulf shipping as well, and Iraq insisted that any agreement must allow it to repair or replace its Gulf oil export facilities. Impasse resulted. 266 Kuwait also negotiated with the Netherlands to buy
mine-hunting ships;267 a UK order had forbidden export of small boats and boat
parts. 268
The UN Secretary-General report mandated by Resolution 552 included States'
concerns over incidents since June 4. The report, later supplemented, expressed
International Transport Workers Federation (ITF) "deep concern" over "serious
escalation of attacks on innocent and neutral merchant ships and their crews" in
the war. The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) chair and the President of
the International Shipping Federation (ISF) also declared that merchant shipping
attacks "had led to much loss oflife and to the destruction and damage of many
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vessels; they appealed to the Secretary-General and the [UN] to continue efforts to
end the attacks." The Secretary-General brought these concerns and Resolution
552 to the belligerents' attention. 269

6.1985: War of the Cities Renewed; The Tanker War Continues;
Heightened Responses.
In 1985 the truce was broken; the War of the Cities was renewed. 270 In April European heads of State issued a declaration asking for the war to end and for
belligerents to stop using chemical weapons; at the same time, however, large shipments of European arms began arriving in Iraq.271 Iraq successfully renewed attacks on Kharg and Iranian tankers; Iran restarted a campaign against neutral
tankers with less success.272 By the end of 1985 "the tanker war had [become] the
most important feature of the Iran-Iraq War.,,273 In June 1985 Iran had intercepted and detainedAI-Muharaq, a Kuwaiti-flag ship Kuwait bound but supposedly carrying "5 tonnes of merchandise clearly intended for Iraq." Iraq had been
using Kuwait as an entry port for goods since the beginning of the war. 274 (It was
only in late 1987 and early 1988 that Iran enacted a prize law;275 this ex post facto
legislation was justification for seizure of AI-Muharaq and other Kuwait-bound
ships.)276 In September Iran's visit and search procedures, looking for strategic
materials for Iraq, were stepped up. Although Iran could not (or chose not to try
to)277 close Hormuz by military action, Iran might succeed in scaring off enough
shipping to make a difference,278 since oil sales financed Iraq's war effort, and it
had to ship through the Gulf, being denied Mediterranean Sea pipeline access except through Turkey.279 Iranian crude was now being ferried in Iranian tankers
from Kharg to Sirri Island in the lower Gulf, where it was stored in "mother" ships
for transfer to customers' tankers. Iranian tanker shuttles also operated between
Kharg and Lavan Island in the lower Gulf. 280 Iran also established a helicopter
base on its offshore Reshadat oil platform 75 miles from the Qatari coast. 281 Iran
was also beginning to feel the pinch of seriously depleted stocks of replacement
parts, particularly for its air force. 282
The August 1985 Casablanca Arab League summit supported prior resolutions
favoring Iraq. "It was against this background that Baghdad mounted its effective
air strikes against Kharg oil terminal.,,283 Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen
and Syria boycotted the meeting; in June 1985 Libya and Iran had signed a Strategic Alliance Treaty. These moves were seen as evidencing growing division in the
Arab world over the war. 284 Turkey continued to support Iraq, the United States
had formally restored diplomatic relations with Iraq in November 1984, and the
US-Iraq trade became three times (at$1 billion), that of the USSR with Iraq. Direct
links between the US embassy in Baghdad and the United States were established?85 France continued as a major supplier for Iraq, although she also supplied
Iran. China was Iran's major supplier through North Korea, but it too supplied
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Iraq, through Egypt. Iran was becoming more isolated, however. 2S6 At the same
time Soviet sales to Iraq increased, the USSR reduced oil imports from financially
strapped Iran. 287
Because of the belligerents' actions, the United States published this NOTMAR
Special Warning in September 1985:
1. u.s. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the ...
Gulfwhich are becoming increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels
outside the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq.
2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases seizure of vessels of
third countries within the ... Strait ofHormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, U.S. mariners
are advised to exercise extreme caution and to be alert to possible hazardous
conditions, including hostile actions, when transiting these waters.
3.... Iran ... has issued guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant
shipping in the ... Gulf, the relevant portions of which are ... :
-After transiting ... Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian ports
should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south ofSirri Island;
south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west of a line
connecting the points 27-55N, 49-53E, and 29-ION, 49-12E.; thereafter south
of the line 29-ION, as far as 48-40E.
-All Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
-All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited.
- ... Iran ... wiII bear no responsibility for merchant ships failing to
comply with the above instructions.
4. Deep draft shipping should be aware of shoal waters south of Farsi Island.
5.... Iraq ... has stated that the area north of29-30N is a prohibited war zone. It
has warned that it wiII attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north
and east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N, 48-30E, 29-25N, 49-09E,
28-23N, 49-47E, 28-23N, 51-00E.... Iraq ... has further warned that all tankers
docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets for the Iraqi Air Force.
6. In view of continued hostilities between Iran and Iraq and recent acts of
interference or hostility against vessels of their countries, U.S. mariners are advised,
until further notice, to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and to remain
outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 3 and 5 above.

The NOTMAR added that the United States did not recognize the validity in law
of any foreign rule, regulation or proclamation so published. 288 "While the United
States obviously recognized provocations by both sides ... , it ... regarded Iranian
attacks against neutral shipping as the major problem. [US] policy regarding the
war was to avoid military involvement, if possible, while providing friendly Gulf
States with [means] ... to defend themselves.,,289 For example, while asserting
freedom of the seas and straits transit passage policies, the United States offered to
work with the Gee and to help it militarily if aid was requested publicly and there
was access to suitable facilities. 290 At about the same time Gee-Iran relations

The War, 1980-88

57

appeared to be improving. 291 Individual GCC members' policies continued as
before, however. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait aided Iraq with $4 billion in 1984, and
late that year Iranian aircraft penetrated the Saudi ADIZ and hit a Kuwait-bound
freighter. There was an assassination attempt on the Kuwaiti emir in May 1985,
said to have been fomented by Iran.292 The United Kingdom announced a $3-4
billion sale of combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia. 293 The UAE mostly continued to
support Iran, with $1 billion in trade between them. The UAE was concerned
about its offshore oil facilities, which pumped two-thirds of its oil. Moreover, 20
percent of its population were Shiites.294
In October 1985 France began defending French-flag merchantmen. A French
warship positioned itselfbetween the Ville d'Angers and an Iranian warship, warning the Iranian that it would use force if the Iranian tried to intercept Ville d'Angers.
French ROE declared that French warships would fire on forces refusing to break
off attacks on neutral merchant ships; the result was a drop in attacks near French
men-of-war. 295
7. 1986: Boarding ofMerchant Ships; Attacks on Shipping and Port Facilities.
On January 12,1986 Iran boarded and searched the President Taylor, a US-flag
vessel. 296 The United States acknowledged a belligerent's right to board and
search but cautioned about overstepping rights and norms, "and even violence, inherent in all ship search incidents.,,297 Later that month the UK justified Iranian
interceptions and seizures of UK-flagged merchantmen as self-defense.298 The
Netherlands recognized the right of visit and search but only for ships proceeding
to and from belligerents' ports. 299 In April 1986 a US destroyer warned an Iranian
warship off what may have been a planned boarding of S.S. President McKinley, a
US flag merchantman.
In February 1986 Security Council Resolution 582 called for a ceasefire; it "Deplore[d] the escalation of the conflict, especially territorial incursions, the bombing
of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the Geneva Gas
Protocol.,,300 That month Iraq extended its exclusion zone up to an area close to
Kuwaiti territorial waters. 301 Also in that month, the United States concluded its
agreement with the United Kingdom for use of Diego Garcia as a naval support facility.302
In May, after more Iranian strikes on shipping, the United States reaffirmed a
commitment to Saudi self-defense, freedom of navigation, free flow of oil, and
open access through Hormuz. 303 That day Iran warned that its naval forces would
attack US warships escorting or convoying cargo ships carrying cargo for Iraq or
which tried to interfere with Iran's interception procedures. 304 A US May 14
NOTMAR advised:
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1. U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the ... Gulf, Strait of
Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of twenty degrees north are
taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. All surface and
subsurface ships and craft are requested to avoid closing U.S. forces closer than five
nautical miles without previously identifying themselves. U.S. forces especially
when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of navigational
considerations ofships and craft in their immediate vicinity. It is requested that radio
contact with U.S. naval forces be maintained on [designated frequencies] when
approaching within five nautical miles of U.S. naval forces. Surface and subsurface
ships and craft that close U.S. naval furces within five nautical miles without making
prior contact and or whose intentions are unclearto such forces may be held at risk by
U.S. defense measures.
2. These measures will also apply when U.S. forces are engaged in transit passage
through ... Hormuz or when in innocent passage through foreign territorial waters
and when operating in such waters with the approval of the coastal State.

The Notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense will be exercised by US naval forces .... [and] will be implemented in a manner that does not
impede the freedom of navigation of any vessel or State.,,30S
In August Iraq bombed Iran's Sirri oil terminal for the first time; a UK-registered, Hong Kong-owned tanker was badly damaged. By that month Iraq had hit
five of the 11 shuttle tankers operating between Kharg and Sirri. Iran's Lavan and
Larak oil terminals were bombed later that year. In September 1986 Iranian warships fired on, stopped and searched a USSR merchantman, PyatT Emtsov, Kuwait
bound with arms ultimately destined for Iraq.306 During 1985-86 Iran inspected
over 1000 vessels. 307 In October Security Council Resolution 588 called for compliance with Resolution 582. 308 In November Iraq bombed the UAE Abu alBukhosh off-shore oil installations.309 The 1986 Iraqi attacks reduced Iranian oil
production considerably; a fall in world oil prices aggravated Iran's economic
straits. 310
A November 20 US International NOTAM reported Iranian airspace was
closed to US-flag aircraft and that
u.S. Naval Forces in the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian
Sea (North of20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL which are not cleared for
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching
closer than 5 nm to U.S. Naval Forces.
It is requested that aircraft approaching within 5 nm of U.S. Naval Forces
establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. Naval Forces on [certain frequencies].
Aircraft which approach within 5 nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. Naval Forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive
measures ... }11
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In that month UK naval presence increased due to increased attacks on neutral
shipping.312
Iraq began to default on foreign loans, but its leading creditors-the FRG,
France, Japan and Turkey-rescheduled debts, along with India and Yugoslavia.
By 1986 Iraq's pipeline through Saudi Arabia was in operation, and another
through Turkey was under construction. Oil sales from these conduits would reassure creditors.313 The USSR began a massive military support program of$4.9 billion for 1986, compared with $4 billion for the previous year, for Iraq. However, in
August Saudi Arabia had to abandon its price-war strategy at the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which helped its relations with Iran. 314
The Soviet Union, under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, appeared to begin a
new policy toward the war, resolving to ending it by expanding diplomatic contacts with Iran. Nevertheless USSR arms sales to Iraq continued until the end. 315
By the next year the Soviet Union was in effect underwriting much of the Iraqi defense effort. 316 Although not known at the time, US arms sales to Iran through Israel in what came to be known as the Iran-Contra affair began about then. 317 A
Danish-flag vessel, Else-HT, made voyages with these goods on board in May and
June from Eilat, an Israeli port on the Gulf of Aqaba and near Jordan's Port of
Aqaba, to Bandar Abbas. 318 After an Iranian attack on a UK merchantman in September, Britain closed Iran's military procurement office in London. Britain was
Iraq's second largest nonmilitary supplier. 319 UK companies helped with tools
and parts too. 320
8. 1987: Escalating US Involvement; Reflagging and Convoys;
Attack on U.S.S. Stark.
In late January 1987 the ICO met in Kuwait and heard the UN Secretary-General call for an international panel to determine war guilt. Iran boycotted the meeting. The United States moved six warships, usually based in Bahrain, to the upper
Gulf to provide naval cover for the meeting. 321 About then an Italian yard delivered two corvettes and a support ship to Iraq; they sailed for Alexandria, Egypt, en
route to Umm Qasr, an Iraqi port. Warned ofa possible Iranian Silkworm attack,
they returned to Italy.322
In March 1987 the United States expressed concern over Iran's testing llOOpound warhead, 85 kilometer range, PRC-manufactured Silkworm missiles in the
Gulf. Kuwait became increasingly concerned about Iranian attacks on its tankers
and requested Soviet and US protection. Internationalization of the Tanker War
was "exactly what [Iran] wanted to avoid, but ... that is precisely what happened."
The war had entered a new phase. 323 (A US congressman also suggested mining
Iranian ports to force it to stop its attacks in the Gul£ )324 In April Iran delivered a
note through Algeria concerning the right of transit passage through the Strait of
Hormuz. The US response rejected an Iranian claim that LOS Convention
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principles were contractual and not customary in nature, saying the LOS Conven~
tion represented longstanding customary law. The United States also "reject[ed] ... any claim by Iran of a right to interfere with any vessel's lawful exercise
of the right of transit passage in a strait used for international navigation.,,325
In May Kuwait and the United States completed negotiations leading to transfer of II tankers owned by Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Co. (KOTC), the Kuwaiti State
shipping company, from the Kuwaiti to the US flag. This preempted the USSR,
which had to settle for chartering three tankers to Kuwait; these charters were
later renewed into 1988.326 The Soviet Union was "deliberately vague on the question of military protection.,,327 The UK position, stated in Parliament after the
first US convoy sailed, was that vessel owners were free to reregister their vessels as
long as national requirements were met, and that with reregistration went an obligation for the Royal Navy to defend these vessels. 328 Three KOTC tankers were
329
later reregistered in Britain. The USSR kept its arrangement with Kuwait in
perspective; a rapid Soviet naval buildup in the Gulf might prompt a much greater
US naval presence and might provoke GCC concerns about the USSR, both contrary to Soviet interests.330 In June 1987 a Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister said the
USSR had no intention of increasing its naval force in the Gulf. 331 Although assailed in some quarters, most commentators felt US reflagging comported with in~
ternationallaw. 332 Iran tried to pursuade Kuwait to stop the reflagging process;
when this failed, Iran declared that Kuwait had practically turned itself into an
Iraqi province with its resources at the disposition of France, the USSR and the
United States. Iran said it could not allow Iraq to receive guaranteed oil income to
beefup its war machine through Kuwaiti tankers flying other flags. 333
At about this time an Iranian patrol boat fired on and damaged a Soviet merchantman, Ivan Koroteav. In mid-Maya Soviet tanker chartered to Kuwait, Marshal Chuykhov, hit a mine which the USSR said Iran laid. A second Kuwait-bound
tanker was mined on June 19. Mines were detected in approaches to the channel
leading to Kuwait's Mina Ahmadi terminal. 334 Mines began appearing through~
out the Gul£ Iranian small boats, Revolutionary Guards crewed, laid them just before a preselected vessel arrived in the area. 335 The Saudi and US navies took a
month to clear the channel to Kuwait and its approaches.3 36 A Soviet response to
attacks on its merchantmen was to deploy three more minesweepers to the Gulf. 337
On May 17 two Iraqi fighter-launched Exocet missiles hit the frigate U.S.S.
Stark, presumably unintentionally. There were deaths and injuries among its crew
and severe damage to the ship.338 (In 1989 Iraq paid US claims for the Stark attack.)339 There is no report of the extent of pollution resulting from loss of bunker
fuel; this appears to be true for later attacks on naval vessels in engagements. The
United States added three ships to MIDEASTFOR, ordered its forces to a higher
state of alert340 and revised its Rules of Engagement (ROE) for possible interactions between US and Iraqi forces and anyone else displaying hostile intent or
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committing hostile acts. 341 UK ROE continued to reflect Britain's view that the
UN Charter, Article 51, governed UK responses. 342 "The rules of engagement
[were] intended to avoid escalation, although the varied nature of potential threat
and the possibility of surprise attack [were] recognized and the inherent right of
self-defence of Royal Navy ships or British merchant vessels under their protection, is not circumscribed or prejudiced." The result would have posed "interesting questions" if a UK warship could have defended UK merchantmen or
British-crewed ships. One "practical solution" might have been that attack on a
merchant ship "might reasonably [have been] perceived as an attack on the warship as well. In that situation, the warship [would] be able to defend itself and in
doing so defend the merchant vessel accompanying it. ,,343 The nature of other naval participants' ROE have not been published, but undoubtedly they reflected, or
were limited by, States' views on the scope of self-defense, national policies, and
defense capabilities. 344
The US ROE had their complement in a July 1987 US NOTAM and NOTMAR:
A. In response to the recent attack on ... Stark and the continuing terrorist threat
in the region[,] U.S. naval vessels operating within the ... Gulf, Strait of Hormuz,
Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional
defensive precautions. It is requested that aircraft (fIxed wing and helicopters)
approaching U.S. naval forces establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval
forces on [designated frequencies]. UnidentifIed aircraft whose intentions are
unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels may be requested to identify
themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected .... [T]o avoid
inadvertent confrontation, aircraft ... including military aircraft may be requested to
remain well clear of U.S. vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and
intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the
aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a
weapons fIre control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive reaction.

The notice was published "solely to advise that measures in self-defense are being
exercised by US naval forces in this region." The NOTAM/NOTMAR closed:
"[T]hese measures will be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere
with the freedom of navigation and overflight[.] ...,,345 This Notice was revised in
September 1987:
In response to the recen t attack on ... Stark and the continuing terrorist threat in
the region, U.S. naval vessels operating within the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of
Oman, and the Arabian Sea, north of 20 degrees north, are taking additional
defensive precautions. Aircraft (fIxed wing and helicopters) operating in these areas
should maintain a listening watch on [certain frequencies]. UnidentifIed aircraft,
whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels, will be
contacted on these frequencies and requested to identify themselves and state their
intentions as soon as they are detected.... [T]o avoid inadvertent confrontation,

62

The Tanker War

aircraft ... including military aircraft may be requested to remain well clear of U.S.
vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions, or to
warnings, and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft ... at risk by
U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a weapons fire
control radar will be viewed with suspicion and could result in immediate U.S.
defensive reaction. This notice is published solely to advise that measures in
self-defense are being exercised by U.S. naval forces in this region. The measures will
be implemented in a manner that does not unduly interfere with the freedom of
navigation and overflight....
U.S. naval forces in the ... Gulf, Strait ofHormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea
(North of 20 Degrees North) are taking additional defensive precautions against
terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL which are not cleared for
approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching
closer than Snm to U.S. naval forces.
It is requested that aircraft approaching within Snm of U.S. naval forces establish
and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies].
Aircraft approaching within Snm at altitudes less than 2000 ft. AGL whose
intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive
measures .... 346
This was a much stronger statement of intentions than the Notice of a year earlier. 347 "In the wake of the Kuwaiti reflagging, it was (perhaps deliberately) left unclear as to how far the [US] protective umbrella was to extend." Promises of escort
for US- flagged ships would "depend ... on the situation" as well as for foreign flag
shipping in certain cases. 348 The US reaction may have been partly due to media
reports of Iran's training 20,000 Revolutionary Guards to attack US ships in fast
Swedish-built "pleasure boats.,,349
In July the US Navy began convoying reflagged tankers. 350 Previously the
United States "had found intermittent convoys an effective deterrent to Iranian
action. Indeed, Iran refrained from harassing ships carrying other flags when they
sailed in the vicinity of US warships. ,,351 Only a small percentage of tankers plying
the Gulfwere convoyed, however. 352 Reflagged tankers carried no contraband to
or oil from Iraq.353 On July 24 the reflaggedBridgeton and on August 10 the Texaco
Caribbean, under charter to a US company, hit mines; the Navy began providing
mine protection. 354 (Although US Navy destroyer types had escorted Bridgeton to
Kuwait, the Navy outfitted Kuwaiti commercial tugs with minesweeping gear for
the return trip. When civilian tug crews refused to undertake minesweeping, Navy
volunteers manned the tugs for the return. 355 "[T]he [Bridgeton] incident opened a
chapter of direct US-Iran naval confrontation in the Gul£,,356 Whether a result of
deliberate Iranian decision or Iranian Revolutionary Guard fervor, mines began
appearing all over the Gulf and outside the Gulf, in the Strait ofHormuz and Gulf
of Oman, and in Kuwaiti and Omani territorial waters. French and UK naval

The War, 1980-88

63

operations expanded to meet the threat in the latter areas. 357 In late August U.S.S.
Guadalcanal rescued an Iraqi fighter pilot downed by an Iranian air-to-air missile
in international waters. He was repatriated through Saudi Red Crescent Society officials. There is no record ofIranian consent or protest. 358
The UK Armilla Patrol began "accompanying" but not escorting or convoying
UK merchantmen; one result was that foreign vessels were attracted to UK registry to gain protection, at least in the lower Gulf, where there were new mine
threats. British vessels were not armed against attacks; UK seafarer unions opposed arming. 359 Italy opposed it as a matter of policy too. 360 After Iranian forces
attacked a French flag cargo ship, Ville d'Anvers, France broke off diplomatic relations. However, even with reinforced naval presence, it could not organize convoy
protection on the US model and relied on a policy of accompanying French flag
ships.361 The USSR sent a Krivak class frigate to escort four Soviet ships carrying
arms from the Strait ofHormuz to Kuwait for ultimate destination in Iraq, a signal
to belligerents that the USSR would protect Soviet-flag ships. 362 Some merchantmen began to carry chaff canisters to confuse incoming missiles; others were repainted dull, non-reflective gray for the same reason. Although most merchant
ships remained unarmed, a US helicopter reported corning under missile fire from
a Greek ship. Iran reportedly completed testing its Silkworm missiles. Press reports said Iran's air force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack merchant shipping like the World War II Japanese kamikazi flights. 363 Iran began
three days of naval maneuvers in the Gulf, dubbed Exercise Martyrdom, which involved firing a shore-to-ship missile and ramming a speedboat loaded with explosives into a dummy naval target. 364 Some Iranian naval maneuvers were in Saudi
territorial waters. 365 Besides traditional boardings, Iran began using helicopters
for visit and search. 366 The Gulfwas becoming a more dangerous place as actors
crowded the arena and employed new techniques for old methods and new
technologies.
Two US warships' Sparrow missiles shot at a radar target suspected of hostile
intent missed, and warning shots were fired across two dhows' bows in August. 367
The US Navy, claiming a right of self-defense, captured the Iranian landing ship
IranAjr caught laying mines in September. 368 Three Iranian crew died, two were
lost at sea, and the United States repatriated 26 crewmen to Iran through Omani
Red Crescent auspices five days later. Shortly thereafter they were turned over to
Iranian officials, along with the remains of the three who had died. It is not known
whether Iraq consented or objected to these arrangements. 369 Iran asserted that
self-defense could only be claimed in response to an armed attack and that this was
aggression. 370 It also promised revenge and gave an "explicit warning" that it
would soon be engaged on another front. 371 However, the US attack "effectively
halted Iranian minelaying for six months.,,372 But by mid-1987 Iranian aircraft,
helicopters, small boats and warships had attacked over 100 ships of30 nationalities.
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Iraq had attacked over 200 vessels, mostly Iranian owned or chartered. 373 In late
May 1987 the USSR had sent three minesweepers to join two frigates that had patrolled the Gulf since 1986; this was in response to Iranian mining of Soviet-flag
ships.374
The June 1987 Venice Economic Summit had "agree[ d] that new and concerted
international efforts [were] urgently required to bring the Iran-Iraq War to an
end." Besides calling upon the belligerents to end the war and supporting the
United Nations, the Summit "reaffirm [ed] that the principle of freedom of navigation in the Gulf is of paramount importance for us and for others and must be upheld. The free flow of oil and other traffic through the Strait ... must continue
unimpeded." The Summit pledged to consult on ways to pursue these important
goals effectively.375 In July unanimous UN Security Council Resolution 598
Deplor[ed] ... bombing of purely civilian population centres, attacks on neutral
shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and
other laws of armed conflict, and ... use of chemical weapons contrary to ... the 1925
Geneva Gas Protocol, ... Demand[ed that belligerents] ... observe an immediate
cease-fire [and] Call[ed] upon all other States to exercise the utmost restraint and to
refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict

The Resolution also declared for the first time during the war that there had been a
breach of the peace and that the Council was acting under the UN Charter, Articles
39_40. 376 Iraq accepted Resolution 598 on July 23. 377 On September 3 the 12-member European Community supported Resolution 598, "strongly condemn[ing] recent attacks on merchant ships in the Gulf and reiterat[ing] ... firm support for the
fundamental principle of freedom of navigation, which is of the utmost importance to the whole international community.,,378
On August 3 Iran had announced it planned naval maneuvers in its territorial
waters in the Gulf and in the Gulf of Oman, warning all vessels, commercial or military, against approaching these waters. Iraq protested, noting that Iranian territorial waters included part of the Strait ofHormuz and waters between the Tunb and
Forur islands, claiming that under the 1982 LOS Convention, Article 38(1),379
and the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention, Article 16(4),380 that Iran could not suspend passage through international straits, and that the International Maritime
Organization (IMO) had declared shipping lanes passing close to Tunb and
Forur. 381
By the end of July US Navy escorts had been receiving informal cooperation
from France and Britain and support and assistance from Saudi Arabia and other
GCC States. 382 In July and August France ordered its aircraft carrier Clemenceau to
the Gulf; France's prime minister declaring, "We have no aggressive intentions,
but we want to be respected and we will be respected.,,383 In August, Britain384 and
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France agreed to send minesweepers to the Gulf, and by September Italian,385 Belgian and Netherlands ships, the latter to operate jointly with Armilla Patrol protection,386 were on the way. Saudi Arabia committed its four minesweepers to
clearance operations. 387 On August 20, the Western European Union (WEU) declared Europe's vital interests required that freedom of navigation in the Gulfbe
assured at all times. 388 The capacity ofWEU members to consult on this policy
"was all the more important[,] given a previous record of disunity.,,389 By now Iran
had lost the international diplomatic leverage ithad been cultivating for the previous three years. 390
On October 8, Iranian speedboats fired on US helicopters; in accordance with
US self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned fire, sinking one
boat and damaging others. Iran claimed the US helicopters fired first and vowed a
"crushing response." Some argued it was a "carefully calculated reprisal.,,391 US
Navy personnel rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members; two
died aboard U.S.S. Raleigh. Survivors and remains were returned to Iran through
Omani Red Crescent auspices. It is not known whether Iraq consented or objected
to repatriation. 392 Later that month the United States, claiming self-defense,
responded to an Iranian Revolutionary Guards Silkworm attack in Kuwaiti
territorial waters on a US flag tanker, Sea Isle City, by destroying the Iranian
Rostum offshore oil platform in the southern Gulf. Sea Isle City's master, a US
national, was blinded in the attack. When the attack on Sea Isle City occurred, it
was not under US Navy convoy; convoying ceased when vessels reached Kuwaiti
territorial waters. Rostum was a Guards gunboat communications base and was
not directly involved in the Silkworm strike. Those manning it were given time to
evacuate before the attack began. Rostum apparently was not engaged in oil
production; therefore, the attack did not create a threat to the environment. 393
The US strike was stated to be in specific response to the Sea Isle City attack;
connection with an Iranian attack on theSungari, which had occurred a day before
Sea Isle City was hit, was avoided. Although Sungari was beneficially US owned, it
was Liberian flagged. 394 Iran claimed the platform attacks were aggression and
that self-defense could only be asserted in response to armed attack. 395 (US import
controls on Iranian goods were said to be a reason for the attacks. 396 There is some
evidence Iran was aiming at oil tankers in the Kuwaiti port of AI-Hamadi, where
Kuwaiti and Saudi oil donated to Iraq was being lifted to pay for ammunition
shipped to Iraq through the Port of Aqaba.)397 US response for the Sea Isle City
Silkworm attack, and not for theSungari attack, established some precedent that at
this time the United States did not consider open registry ships, even if owned by
US interests, to have enough connection to merit protection. This view changed as
the war deepened, at least where US nationals were in the crew. 398 There were no
more confrontations with the United States for the next six months as a result of
the US response on Rostum. 399 Iranian Guards speedboats continued to harass
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unprotected shipping; 400 three days after the US response to the Sea Isle City
attack, Iran hit the Kuwaiti deep-water Sea Island Termina1. 401 Iran made it clear
that this action was intended as retaliation for the Rostum attack. 402
This exchange of blows was notable because ofIran's care not to attack the US
directly but to target its regional allies .... [T]he most Iran did was to probe the extent
and scope of the US commitment ... to find the weak links, the grey areas. Yet it did
over-reach itself when it was caught red-handed in minelaying, thus unwittingly
providing ammunition to those who argued that it was Iran that constituted a menace
to the freedom of navigation .... [I]t found the impulse to defy the United States,
whatever the consequences, irresistible, providing the [Iranian Islamic] revolution
with the high drama that it so cherished, even at the risk of diverting from the
princip[al] issue-the land war.... Iranian leaders were confident that the US
presence could not last forever, that sooner or later the expense of the enterprise and
the distraction of other issues ... would see a withdrawal of the US fleet. 403

Future events would prove this assessment to be incorrect. By the end of 1987
Western naval presence in the Gulf appeared more durable than might earlier have
been expected. However, for the time being Iran continued to see its strategy paying off, weakening US credibility with its Gulf allies, exasperating its military, and
drawing the United States from impartiality to messy partisanship.404
In November, an Arab League Extraordinary Summit "expressed anxiety at the
continuation of the war and voiced ... indignation at [Iran's] intransigence, provocations and threats to the Arab Gulf States." The Summit "condemned Iran's ...
procrastination in accepting ...Resolution 598 ... [, and] called on Iran to accept
the Resolution and implement it in toto . .." The Summit asked the international
community to "shoulder its responsibilities, exert effective international efforts
and adopt measures adequate to make [Iran] respond to the calls for peace." Iraq's
accepting Resolution 598 and positive response to peace initiatives was appreciated. It confirmed support for Iran's defending its territory and "legitimate rights"
but declared solidarity with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as to Iranian threats, aggression and violations of holy places. 40S A few days later Iranian speedboats shot up
three tankers carrying Saudi oil, but Syrian pressure succeeded in getting Iran to
refrain from hitting targets in Kuwait. 406 Iran's president visited the United Nations to discuss a peace plan. However, UN diplomatic activity was to stop by early
1988.407 Nevertheless, the Secretary-General continued to press Iran to accept the
UN proposa1.408 It was only in October 1987 that Iran and Iraq formally broke off
diplomatic relations,409 a further sign of polarization.
During that month a US warship fired on a UAE fishing vessel, resulting in a
death and three injured crew; the United States said it fired in self-defense but expressed regret over the incident, which had occurred between the UAE coast and
Abu Musa, from which Iranian speedboats carried out Gulf shipping raids. 410 The
United States was particularly concerned about small boats; Iran had been
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conducting naval maneuvers in its exclusion zone and territorial waters, including
simulated speedboat attacks on suicide runs. 411 In December a US warship helped
rescue a Cypriot crew after an Iranian gunboat attack set their tanker ablaze.
Tanker masters began tailing convoys or simulating them during night steaming. 412 During that monthH.M.S. Scylla and York protected merchant ships from
Iranian speedboat attacks.413
On December 11, NATO Council "Ministers underlined the importance of an
early and full implementation of [Resolution] 598. They also recalled the importance offreedom and security of navigation in the Gulf. They call [ed] for appropriate follow-up action ... to resolve these problems.,,414 Late in December a GCC
conference confined itself to expressing "deep regret at 'the destructive war' ... and
urging the UN Security Council to implement Resolution 598 as soon as possible."
Part of this was due to Omani and UAE opposition, caused by the geography that
compelled Oman and Iran to patrol Hormuz jointly, and the UAE's financial affiliation with Iran. The growing risk to neutral shipping increased trade through the
UAE, where goods would be shipped overland. Sentiment against an arms embargo directed toward Iran was the same in the GCC and the Security Council.
Nevertheless, the December GCC Summit approved a comprehensive security
strategy that may have amounted to a collective self-defense pact.41S However,
some governments, notably China, France, the FRG and the USSR, were persuaded that Iran's not rejecting Resolution 598 meant Iran might be genuinely interested in a negotiated settlement to end the war. Permanent Security Council
members (China, France, USSR) would veto any US-sponsored resolution to impose sanctions.416 Iran claimed naval presences from States outside the Gulfviolated Resolution 598, Article 5.417
Meanwhile, the USSR and the United States continued to support Iraq, the Soviet Union through military supplies, the United States by $961 million in agricultural commodity credits in 1987.418 The USSR and its Eastern European s~tellites
continued to send negligible amounts of military equipment to Iran, but there was
no question about the USSR's priorities.419
9. 1988: End Game: Intensity ofResponses; Collapse and Ceasefire.
A January 2, 1988 US NOTMAR reflected the intensity of the situation:
1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the ...
Gulf, the Strait ofHormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, due to hostilities between Iran and
Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters
and to remain outside the areas delimited in paragraphs 2 and 3 below until further
notice.
2. Iran has stated:
A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones.
B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited.
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e. Guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the ...
Gulf are ... : aftertransiting ... Hormuz, merchant ships sailing to non-Iranian
ports should pass 12 miles south of Abu Musa Island; 12 miles south of Sirri
Island; south of Cable Bank Light; 12 miles south of Farsi Island; thence west
of a line connecting the points 27-SSN. 49-S3E. and 29-lON. 49-12E.;
thereafter south of the line 29-lON. as far as 48-lOE.
D .... Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply
with the above instructions.
E. Iranian naval forces patrol the Gulf of Oman up to 400 kilometers from
the Strait ofHormuz.
3. Iraq has stated:
A. The area north of29-30N. is a prohibited war zone.
B. It will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north and
east of a line connecting the following points: 29-30N. 48-30E., 29-2SN.
49-09E., 28-23N. 49-47E., 28-23N. Sl-OOE.
e. All tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets
for the Iraqi Air Force.
4. Several vessels have suffered damage from moored or floating mines in the ...
Gulf. U.S. mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters throughout the Gulf
region and particularly in the following areas where moored mines have been
encountered:
A. The Mina Al AhmadilMina Ash Shu'aybah Channel (28-S6N. 48-S3E.)
and its approaches.
B. The shipping channels south and west of Farsi Island.
S. Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces visit, search and in some
cases seize or divert to Iranian ports vessels of non-belligerents in the Persian
Gulf/Gulf of Oman region.
The United States took no position on the zones' legal validity.420 During 1987 the
belligerents had attacked 178 merchantmen.421
At the end of January 1988 Iran promulgated a prize law, article 3 of which declared the following to be war prizes:
(a) All goods, merchandise, means of transport and equipment belonging to a
State or to States at war with ... Iran.
(b) Merchandise and means of transport ... belonging to neutral States or their
nationals, or to nationals of the belligerent State if they could effectively contribute to
increasing the combat power of the enemy or their final destination, either direcdy or
via intermediaries, is a State at war with ... Iran.
(c) Vessels flying the flag of a neutral State as well as vehicles belonging to a
neutral State transporting the goods set out in this article.
(d) Merchandise, means of transport and equipment which ... Iran forbids from
being transported to enemy territory.422

The Law provided that property listed in Article 3(a), i.e., property ofa State at war
with Iran, would become the property ofIran; Article 3(b) and 3(c) property, i.e., of
neutrals would be confiscated and adjudicated. Article 3(d) means of transport
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would "become the property of... Iran or be confiscated according to circumstances. Any person contesting this must appear before the [prize] Tribunal.,,423
Iraqi attacks on tankers resumed February 10, 1988, after a month's lul1. 424 The
War of the Cities began again on February 28, 1988; Iran shelled Basra after Iraq
bombed an oil refinery near Tehran. Iraq hit Halabja, an Iraqi town captured by
Iran, with chemical weapons in March. Later that month Saudi Arabia confirmed
buying 1600-mile CSS-2 ballistic missiles from the PRC. On March 30 Iranian
gunboats fired on a Kuwaiti military base on Bubiyan Island.
In early 1988 the United States noted Willingness to consider a UN Gulf naval
force, if a collective action concept was spelled out clearly; the United States would
not support a UN force replacing US and US-aligned forces. 425 The United Kingdom was unenthusiastic,426 but Italy and the USSR supported the idea. 427 The Soviet Union wanted to replace the large Western naval presence with a UN
flotilla. 428
During this time there were clashes involving US naval forces, several with Iran
and one with Iraq.429 On April 14 U.S.S. SamuelB. Roberts, a frigate like Stark, hit a
mine in a field Iran laid in shipping lanes in international waters 70 miles east of
Bahrain.430 In response, on April 18, the United States engaged Iranian warships
and neutralized two Iranian oil platforms that had conducted or supported attacks
on neutral shipping. Occupants of the two oil platforms (Sassam and Sirri, both located in the lower Gulf) were first given the opportunity to evacuate. Sirri had been
responsible for about eight percent ofIran's oil exports. Iran saw the US response
(which represented an escalation in US military action) as siding with Iraq, perhaps because Iraq reconquered al-Faw near Basra the day ofthe Sassan/Sirri attack.
Several Iranian naval units, including two frigates, were destroyed or damaged
during that operation.431 This engagement, dubbed Operation Praying Mantis,
was the largest combined air and surface engagement in war-at-sea forthe US Navy
since World War II. Iran protested the platform attacks as aggression. 432 The
United States rejected the protest. 433 A few days later Iranian speedboats attacked
an oil rig in the UAE Mubarak oil field, operated by US interests, 30 miles north
of Sharjah, and a tanker and freighter that were nearby. While thus engaged the
boats were hit by US air strikes. 434 Shipping and oil commerce in the southern
Gulf virtually stopped for two days. UK- and French-accompanied convoys were
temporarily halted.435 Some commentators trace the turning point in the war to
April 17-18, when Iran lost the Fao peninsula to Iraq and their warships to the US
Navy.436
By now five NATO nations besides the United States-Belgium, Britain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands-had sent over 25 warships to the Gulffor escort
and mine suppression duty. The FRG, constitutionally restricted from sending
forces there, augmented its Mediterranean Sea NATO presence with four ships.
Nonvay sent a minesweep to NATO Channel Command; Luxembourg, which has
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no navy, backed the Belgian-Dutch commitment financially. Australia and Japan,
the latter also constitutionally limited, installed precise navigation transmitters in
the Gulf and dispatched diver and mine disposal teams. The Netherlands Navy
collaborated very closely with the Royal Navy. Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands
probably would not have deployed forces except for WEU's political cover. 437
French forces, reflecting France's longterm withdrawal from the NATO command structure, operated independently438 but cooperated with other navies,
agreeing to consult within the WEU framework. 439 Italy followed the same policy.440 WEU naval experts convened regular meetings in London to discuss the
evolving threat. 441 Even the USSR and US navies occasionally cooperated in finding and destroying Iranian mines. 442 At about the same time Hans Dietrich
Genscher, the FRG foreign minister, was emerging as representing Iranian interests in efforts to end hostilities through mediation.443 However, "the unprecedented international concern and focus on the war in the United Nations and in
the Gulf's waters, with the extraordinary and unprecedented participation of
many European NATO States in an 'out ofarea' operation, ushered in a new phase"
of the war. 444 The multinational maritime naval operation was not, however, under the command of any State or States. 445
After Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi-owned tanker offDubai on April 24,446
on April 29 the United States announced it would begin assisting "friendly, innocent neutral vessels flying a nonbelligerent flag outside declared war exclusion
zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a
... Gulfbelligerent.... Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance
[would] be rendered by a US warship or aircraft if this unit [was] in the vicinity and
its mission permit[ted] rendering such assistance.,,447 This incremental US escalation, partly in response to requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE and US oil shippers navigating under foreign flags,448 was a more generous protection promise
than Britain had announced in February, when UK policy shifted to permit protecting foreign flag ships having a clear majority UK interest in ownership.449
This did not include Armilla Patrol protection for ships on which British seamen
were employed.450 Although officially more conservative than the US policy, it
was a distinction without a difference, since UK warships gave humanitarian assistance to neutral vessels after an attack and were prepared to interpose between
an attacker and a target ship. The interposing warships were prepared to assert
self-defense if attacked while helping a foreign vessel. France pursued a similar,
perhaps more forward-leaning interposition policy. French warships were "available to assist [meI:chantmen] according to circumstances.,,451 What French warships would do in a confrontation is less than clear; French ROE stated options,
but these have not been published.452 Italian escort was limited to Italian-flag merchantmen, although Italian ROE promised response if a belligerent committed a
hostile act; the ROE did not contemplate "repressive acts" directed toward bases of
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operation. 453 NATO countries agreed to provide mutual support and cooperation
in keeping international waterways free of mines,454 although France operated
separate mine clearance455 and Italy had separate bilateral arrangements for the
work. 456
In May 1988 Iraqi air strikes hit Iran's Larak oil terminal in the Strait of
Hormuz. Seawise Giant, Liberian registered and the world's largest supertanker,
was among five ships damaged. 457 Iran began a 10-day combined forces exercise in
the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman, to show that its maritime power was not as
crippled as the United States had said.458
The July 3 Airbus tragedy arose in the context ofIraqi speedboat attacks and
concern over possible air attacks on US warships, or its supply barges anchored in
Kuwaiti waters, perhaps to coincide with the Fourth ofJuly.459 In April 1988, during Operation Praying Mantis,460 Iranian military aircraft had taken off from the
nearby Bandar Abbas airport, also used by civil aviation. These aircraft appeared
close to commencing attacks on US aircraft but did not.461 Other Iranian aircraft
had exhibited "targeting behavior" while observing Praying Mantis events from
afar, apparently to provide radar information,462 i.e., to possibly vector closer
planes to targets. On July 2-3 Iranian speedboats positioned themselves at the
western approach to the Strait ofHormuz to challenge merchant ships, a tactic that
had been a prelude to attack. 463 During the evening of July 2, U.S.S. Elmer Montgomery had responded to a distress call from a Danish tanker under Iranian speedboat attacks.464 That same day nvo Iranian F-14s came within seven miles of
U.S.S. Halsey.465 Other F-14s were known to be at Bandar Abbas. 466 After Montgomery heard challenges over the radio and many speedboats were seen approaching a Pakistani merchantman on July 3, U.S.S. Vincennes was sent to the area to
investigate the Montgomery report. Vincennes' helicopter was fired on by Iranian
small boats, which "were deemed to have hostile intent." Vincennes opened fire on
the boats. Two minutes later, Iran Air Flight 655, a civil airliner, took off from
Bandar Abbas for Dubai, across the Gulf, on a flight path through the area of the
on-going naval battle near Hormuz. 467 Seven minutes later and after repeated
radio warnings, and owing to Vincennes' preoccupation with the ongoing surface
action and misinterpretation of electronic information and commercial air schedules on board, Vincennes fired surface to air missiles that destroyed Flight 655.
When Vincennes' commanding officer gave the order to fire, in the middle of the
surface melee, he "believed that the Vincennes and the Montgomery were the subject
ofa coordinated sea and air attack involving [Iranian] Revolutionary Guard speedboats and an F-14 aircraft." The United States claimed a right of self-defense for
the mistaken attack.468
A week after the Airbus tragedy, US ship-based helicopters attacked Iranian
gunboats that had set afire a Panama-registered, Japanese-owned tanker with US
nationals in the crew,469 thus implementing the new US policy of defending other
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countries' merchantmen upon their request and consistent with other US operational commitments.470
By the end of the war the US Navy had conducted over 100 convoys in the
Gulf.471 Other navies were also engaged in numerous escort operations.
On the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia broke relations with Iran April 27, 1988,
a few days after US actions against Iranian warships and speedboats.472 Perhaps
more importantly, during that year a pipeline from AI-Zubair in Iraq to Yanbu in
Saudi Arabia was completed, allowing Iraqi oil to flow to Yanbu, where it could be
shipped to South Africa for hard currency or arms. 473 Iraq may have also completed a smaller pipeline to Turkey that year, which with the Yanbu line would
have boosted its oil exports to 3.2 million barrels a day, about the prewar peak
level.474 This may have been a counterpoint to Iran's economic cooperation accord
of the previous summer with the Soviet Union, by which the USSR agreed to build
a pipeline to carry Iranian oil to the Black Sea. A shipping route in the Caspian Sea
was settled. A second connection between airline and railway systems was also
planned. 475 However, Iran's economy was in a shambles, with only $1 billion in
foreign exchange reserves left, after an upswing the year before. Part of this erosion
was due to Iraqi bombing in the first quarter ofl988, which reduced oil production
considerably.476
In June 1988 a second Arab League Extraordinary Summit reaffirmed its 1987
stand on the war. 477 On June 15 the European Community and the GCC issued a
joint political declaration:
... They explicitly emphasized that freedom of navigation and unimpeded flow of
trade is a cardinal principle in international relations and international law. In this
context, they call upon the international community to safeguard the right of free
navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all
ports and installations ofthe [Gulf] littoral States ... not parties to the hostilities.478
The June 20 Toronto Economic Summit supported Resolution 598, condemned
use of chemical weapons, deplored proliferation of ballistic missiles in the region,
and "renew[ed the Group of Seven] commitment to uphold ... freedom ofnavigation in the Gulf.,,479 By mid-June Britain and France had restored diplomatic relations with Iran. (The United States had severed relations with Iran during the
hostage crisis,480 and these were not restored.) Saudi Arabia announced a $12-30
billion arms deal, including six to eight minesweepers, with Britain and bought
1600-mile ballistic missiles from China.481
Iran announced acceptance of Resolution 598 on July 17;482 on August 8 the
UN Secretary-General announced a ceasefire effective August 20.483 The next day
the Council approved the Secretary-General's report on the war and decided to establish UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)484 to help the peace
process.485 Withdrawal from occupied territories began, but the 1990-91 war
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ended UNIIMOG's mandate. 486 UNIIMOG seemed to have worked reasonably
well during its short commission. 487 Negotiations between Iran and Iraq with respect to their disputed border began simultaneously with the ceasefire and continued thereafter.488 These discussions broke down over Iraq's insistence that it
should control the entire Shatt aI-Arab waterway; neither side was prepared to
compromise on this issue, and both refused a political solution. However, two
weeks after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Iraq conceded most Iranian demands,
agreeing to revert to the 1975 treaty providing for joint sovereignty over the Shatt
and to return prisoners of war (POWs). These concessions had been Iranian peace
conditions stated soon after the 1980 Iraqi invasion.489 No major exchanges of
POWs, mostly captured ground forces but undoubtedly including naval personnel, came until 10 years later. 490
Iran announced on August 20 it would continue inspecting vessels during the
ceasefire; this was a largely theoretical gesture,491 although Iraq protested it. 492
The commitment of the European naval force was extended to clear 2000 mines
from the northern Gulf and the Shatt aI-Arab after the ceasefire. Operation
Cleansweep has been hailed as the "culmination ofa major pioneering landmark in
European naval co-operation." There had been no coordination of merchant ship
protection among WEU navies, however. 493 The United States announced the end
of escorted convoy operations in the Gulf in October 1988, although US forces
would be positioned to act if US-flagged vessels were directly threatened. 494 Later
this was replaced by a monitoring system. 49S In January 1989 "deflagging" procedures for reverting the tankers to the Kuwaiti ensign began. 496 In March 1990 the
last US Navy minesweepers came home.497 Increased US naval presence in the
Gulf, resulting in over 100 convoys, was considered an "unqualified success;,,498
other participating States gave their operations high marks. 499 Iraq, deeply in debt
to several Western States, Japan and the USSR, declared victory, and Iran felt
skeptical relief, at the end ofhostilities. SOO

Part C. Conclusions
"The Iran-Iraq conflict was a major war, not a small war. For the only time since
\Vorld War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against merchant ships" by the belligerents.SOl It was also one of the longest wars of the century, with a million casualties, mostly in the land campaigns. S02 Perhaps virtually
every Iraqi family lost a son, brother or father,S03 or 150,000 killed among 400,000
casualties. An entire generation lost a decade of its life, and the country had only
begun to face the social costs it would have to pay.S04 For Iran, the war brought disillusionment and moderation in its Islamic fundamentalism and perhaps 300,000
dead. sos Direct and indirect economic costs ofthe war to Iran and Iraq came to
about $1.2 trillion, plus another $1.1 trillion to rebuild their economies. "The total
cost of the war exceed[ed] the oil revenue of the two States throughout the
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twentieth century.,,506 Iraq's booming prewar economy and rapid economic development may have been set back two decades, and a large non-Arab debt remained
to slow economic recovery.507 Iraq's foreign debt stood at $65 billion in 1985, with
perhaps half owed GCC States; it had ballooned to $100 billion at the war's end. 508
Iraq's only positive gain may have been in its armed forces; its ground forces were
five times larger with 955,000 effectives at the war's end; by 1988 Iraq had doubled
its available tanks and aircraft. 509 Nearly all of the increase in military hardware
was due to Soviet aid. 510 Counting reserves, Iraq had nearly all the working population of the country under arms. 511 Iran also increased its total active military
manpower, mostly in ground forces, but its mechanized units, combat aircraft,
tanks, artillery and naval power were reduced considerably by the last years of the
war. 512
It was a war that resolved nothing, changed little, toppled neither regime, and
settled none of the underlying issues. 513
... [T]his [was] a war worthy of a place of honour in Barbara Tuchman's March of
Folly. It will be cited as a classic example of the power of an individual's blind
dogmatism in totalitarian states to lead a people towards disaster and thereby to
change history. This occurrence could well repeat itself[,] especially in the prevailing
instability presided over by autocratic regimes in the Middle East. 514

The 1990-91 Gulf War, beginning with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, began two years
later515 and proves the point; there may be repetitions in the future. The key lesson
to be learned from the war, according to Chaim Herzog, then President oflsrael,
was that no State can survive militarily in isolation. "The nations of the world are
interdependent, and a major element in any middle and small nation's military capability must ... be based on its international economic and political standing.
The ... War proved that this must be a major and vital consideration in the defence
of any country.,,516
The war at sea, while relatively less costly in terms of life and less important
than the land, air and missile campaigns in terms of people involved, was a significant part of the conflict.

1. The Tanker War.
The Tanker War was the most important aspect of naval warfare during the
conflict. Sl7 It was the largest loss of merchant ships and mariners' lives since the
Second World War:
Throughout the eight year ... War, Iran and Iraq ... attacked more than 400
commercial vessels, almost all of which were neutral State flag ships. Over 200
merchant seamen ... lost their lives.... [T]he attacks ... resulted in excess of 40
million dead weight tons of damaged shipping. Thirty-one of the attacked merchants
were sunk, and another SO [were] declared total losses. For 1987 alone, the strikes
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against commercial shipping numbered 178, with a resulting death toll of 108. In
relative terms, by the end ofl987, write-offlosses in the Gulf War stood at nearly half
the tonnage of merchant shipping sent to the bottom in World War II. ... [S]hips .. .
of more than 30 different countries, including ... permanent members of the .. .
Security Council, [were] subjected to attacks.

Only about one percent of Gulf voyages involved attacks, however. Sl8 Nevertheless, in terms ofpercentages oflosses due to maritime casualties worldwide, the statistics were staggering. During 1982, the first year of the Tanker War, 47 percent of
all Liberian-flag tonnage losses due to maritime casualty worldwide occurred in
the Gulf. In 1986 the figure was 99 percent; in 1987, more than 90 percent, and the
final percentages may have gone higher due to marine insurance underwriters' late
declaration of constructive total losses. Flags of convenience were flown by most
Gulf tankers, a third being owned by US nationals, with another substantial portion chartered by US nationals. The financial loss to US interests was therefore
substantial. Insured losses declared by underwriters were heavy, reaching $30 million in one month, with resulting tremendous increases in war risk premiums. The
total cost of conducting the war, and the direct and indirect damage caused by it,
was nearly $1.2 trillion. If there were
any good things that could be said of this conflict, they [were] that the Gulf War
[became] the principal factor in reducing the overtonnage of the world oil tanker fleet
and in aiding a recovery of the tanker market, and ... tremendous advances in marine
firefighting equipment and techniques [were] directly attributable to recent
experience in the Gulf.

To a US government expert, "this [was] too thin a silver lining to justify the
cloud."SI9 Iran attacked ships of more than 32 national flags, while Iraq mostly
concentrated on vessels flagged or chartered by Iran. Iraq concentrated on attacking ships within Iran's war zone, while Iran mostly attacked vessels in the lower
Gulf, outside its or Iraq's zones. Iraq tended to shoot first and identify later, while
Iran conducted careful vessel reconnaissance and specific vessel identification.
Iraq used aircraft for its strikes, while Iran employed conventional aircraft, helicopters, surface combatants and small boats, the latter manned by Revolutionary
Guard forces. S20 Iraq never caused a major interruption in Iran's exports to finance
its war. S2I
Several warships-US frigates Samuel B. Roberts and Stark, and major units of
the belligerents' navies as well as smaller craft like Iran Ajr-were severely damaged or sunk. Some losses resulted from opposing belligerents' attacks, some occurred through mistake, and some through self-defense responses by States not
party to the conflict. There were deaths and injuries among crews. Belligerents and
neutrals lost air crews through combat losses or accidents. There were losses of
personnel at offshore terminals and other oil facilities. These facilities, including
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some in territories of neutral States, were also damaged. Attacks on oil platforms
resulted in deaths, injuries, and material destruction. The Vincennes tragedy
caused 290 deaths. 522 These losses do not include those incurred during the land
campaigns. 523
One interesting result of the war was reduced use of the Strait of Hormuz as an
oil lifeline to the West. While tankers lifted nearly 20 million barrels a day through
the Strait in 1978, this had been reduced to 6.4 billion in 1985. Oil discoveries outside the Gulf, pipelines from Iraq through Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and the Saudis' construction of an east-west pipeline with capacity of 3.2-5 million barrels a
day may be "insurance-in case the Strait ... is closed." These developments may
inhibit skyrocketing oil prices if there are more political-military developments in
the region. 524 Yet another factor is increased production from other oil fields, e.g.,
the North Sea.

2. The Marine Environment.
The environment was also a loser, a major casualty to the Gulfbeing the 1983
Nowruz attack. 525 Undoubtedly attacks on other terminals and offshore oil facilities caused spills.526 And undoubtedly attacks on loaded tankers and other vessels,
ships in ballast and warships, resulted in loss of cargoes, primarily petroleum, and
bunkers.527 Aircraft losses likely spread sheens on the Gulf. 528 Apart from the
Nowruz spill, there is no indication that States considered the impact of military
activity on the environment or the developing law protecting it.529 Completion of
overland oil pipelines530 may reduce risk of pollution at sea in the Gulf, but these
pipelines are vulnerable to attack by any number of methods (particularly if laid
close to the shore) during war or accidents at any time. Pipeline construction has
only shifted the environmental risk to the land.
3. The Role of the United States and the Soviet Union.
In terms of US policy, it has been said that
By playing a leading role in the Gulf as well as in the United Nations, the United
States unquestionably helped bring Iran to the negotiating table ... U.S. policy
helped reestablish U.S. credibility among the GulfArab States by demonstrating that
the United States could sustain a low-key, politically sensitive, and consistent
military policy.... U.S. military planners were quite pleased with the ... cooperation
they enjoyed from Gulf States normallyreluctantto be so forthcoming.... U.S. policy
"kept the Soviets out of the Gulf" in any significant operational sense, while U.S.
policymakers nonetheless worked successfully with the Soviets in the United
Nations in forging Resolution 598. All these produced ... satisfaction among U.S.
diplomats involved in the year's [1988's] events.
. . . [T]he United States shared credit for bringing the cease-fire into effect with a
wide range of factors. Iraq's extended bombing campaign, of which the tanker war
was but a minor part, slowly ground Iran's economy down to crisis levels by the end of
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1987, and Iran's efforts to deal with its economy only exacerbated deep fissures
among competing political factions in Tehran. Economic deprivation combined
with battlefield stalemate to produce ... war weariness across Iran .... The "war of the
cities" provoked confusion and fear out of all proportion to the relatively meager
physical damage .... In some sense, Iraq can be said to have won its war with Iran.

Luck also played a role. 531 Other factors that might be mentioned, at least in the
context of the Tanker War, included cooperation of the Gulf States and US NATO
allies and other States affected by the war's dislocations and attacks on their shipping. The overwhelming supply of arms and other goods to Iraq also was a major
factor. 532 However, "[i]t should now be clear that US involvement in the Gulf during the ... War, particularly during the ... 'tanker war' ... was part ofalong-standing continuum of American foreign policy.,,533
The USSR tried to achieve several goals: preserving its influence in Iraq, gaining influence in the GCC and Iran, and reducing US influence in the region,e.g., by
chartering tankers to Kuwait. The war bolstered Soviet standing in the region. At
war's end Iraq could not afford to alienate the USSR or end its dependence on Soviet arms supplies. Iran would have to improve its relations with the Soviet Union
to encourage the USSR to moderate its support ofIraq. While the Gulf States were
much less dependent on the Soviet Union, they were not anxious to see the USSR
leave the Gulf after the war; Soviet presence was seen as useful to keep the United
States concerned about the region. Soviet post-war gains were therefore not significant. With the war over, there were fewer opportunities and greater obstacles for
extending Soviet political and military influence in the Gulf. 534 The USSR's disintegration three years later of course meant loss of whatever gains it had made
during the war. Iraq lost an arms supplier, Iran lost a whipping boy,535 and the
other Gulf States lost a makeweight. The Soviet Union's demise meant a triumph
of US policy, and just in time for the 1990-91 GulfWar.536

4. The Role ofInternational Organizations.
The United Nations, and particularly the Security Council, emerged from Cold
War gridlock to a more active role in peacemaking. Its resolutions affirming freedom of navigation are particularly important for this analysis. 537 The Arab
League, at first gridlocked because ofdivisions among its members, some ofwhom
(e.g., Syria) supported Iran and others Iraq (e.g., Kuwait, Saudi Arabia), came together at the end of the war. 538 States in other established international organizations, e.g., individual NATO members, cooperated together more or less under the
WEU with Persian Gulf States to support freedom of navigation. WEU's revitalization has been traced to the Tanker War shipping threat. 539 These European
States, while following a Western political strategy, were able to distinguish themselves from US policy. They made separate, if not radically different, defmitions of
Western interests in the Gulf. Deployment of European naval power to the Gulf
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improved the status of European States with many Gulf Cooperation Council
members, particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 540
The European Community, evolving into the European Union during the war
years, and the Economic Summits lent diplomatic pressure to end the conflict. 541
Nevertheless, it appeared likely that although the EU will harmonize policies in
Europe, European States will muddle through with individual policies in the Gulf
in the future. 542
However, the most impressive development during 1980-88 was the organization of the Gulf Cooperation Council of other Gulf States in 1981, which by war's
end could "have good reasons for being pleased and confident .... They ... successfully weathered the Iranian revolution, eight years of Iran-Iraq fighting, and a
whole range of direct or covert Iranian efforts to undermine them. They [could]
reasonably argue that the future [could] not be worse than the recent past.,,543 It
has been correctly predicted that
... [T]he Gee states will strive to maintain their unity to limit the chances of
turmoil spreading from one state to the rest. Together, they will try to hew a middle
path between Iran and Iraq ... to achieve a balance of power in the Gulf and limit the
opportunities for super-power intervention .... Because the Gee states can never
attain an even mildly formidable ... defense posture, their attention is properly
focused on diplomacy. Nevertheless, practical steps toward closer security
cooperation ... can serve to deny the attractions of outside meddling in the affairs of
the weaker members of the community, and put the larger powers on notice that the
Gee states are det~rmined to act together to preserve their political integrity.544

For the United States, a problem could be military equipment purchases from
other countries, thereby lessening dependence on America while increasing dependence on other States.545

5. The Ensuing Chapters.
From any perspective the Tanker War was costly in terms of people, property,
pollution of the environment, and perhaps international law. The Chapters that
follow analyze the war in the context of the UN Charter, and in particular the inherent right ofindividual and collective self-defense in Article 51 ;546 the law of the
sea in the con text of the Persian Gulf;547 the law of naval warfare, apart from Charter considerations, at stake in the Tanker War;548 and the law of the sea, the law of
the maritime environment, and the law of naval warfare. 549
NOTES
1. I delivered parts of this Chapter as a paper, "Targeting Enemy Merchant Shipping and Neutral Merchant
Vessels That Have Acquired Enemy Character: State Practice Following World War II," at the Naval War College
Symposium on the Law of Naval Warfare, February 1-3, 1990, Newport, R.I., which was published, revised, asSlale
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PractICe in Grunawalt. Other portions were part of a research report, U.S. National Security Interests in the Persian Gulf:
The MaritIme Strategy Reconsidered, March 8, 1989, to fulfill National Defense University diploma requirements.
2. Peter Hayes, Chronology 1988, 68 FOREIGN AI-v. 220, 236 (1989); see also nn. 484-92 and accompanying texL
This Chapter's history of events, 1980-88, has been compiled in part from HIRO, NAVIS & HOOTEN and FOREIGN
AFFAIRS' America and the World issue; usually there is no further citation of these sources unless there is particular
relevance. Sec Elaine P. Adam, Chronology 1981, 60 id. 719, 734-35, 739-40 (1982); Janis Kreslins, Chronology 1982, 61
id. 714, 725-26 (1983); Chronology 1983, 62 id. 777, 788-92(1984); Chronology 1984, 63 id. 672, 682-86 (1985); Kay King,
Chronology 1985, 64 id. 645, 658-61 (1986); Horace B. Robertson, Chronology 1986, 65 id. 653, 662-76 (1987); Hayes,
Chronology 1987, 66 id. 638,655-60 (1988); Hayes 232-38. Another summary is in 26 ILM 1434 (1987). Other citations,
nn. 3-549, refer to accounts, often from media sources, of particular events.
3. S.C. Res. 593, in WELLENS 454.
4. John H. Cushman,Jr.,N~toEnd Convoys in Gu/fButlt W,1IStiIlProtectShips, N.Y. TlMES,SepL 17,1988,at2.
5. Kuwaillo "Deflag" Ships, WINSTON-SALEMJ.,Jan.19, 1989, at 9; for analysis ofthe reflagging, see Parts IV.C.3,
IV.C.6, IV.D.5, V.D.2, V.D.4, V.JA.
6. Last 3 "Sweeps" HeadHome, US NavY Internal Relations Activity, Information for Your Use4 (May 1990);see
also TAMARA MOSER MELIA, "DAMN THE TORPEDOES." A SHORT HISTORY OF U.S. NAVAL MINE COUNTERMEASURES,
1777-1991, at 127 (1991).
7. RAt BURRELL & ALVtN J. CoTTRELL, IRAN, THE ARABIAN PENINSULA, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN 2 (1972); HtRO 2;
Andrea Gioia, Commentary, in DE GUTTRY & RONzrrn57.

8. Sec generally, e.g., NORMAN FRIEDMAN, DESERT VICTORY: THE WAR for KUWAIT (1991); US Department of
Defense, Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (Apr. 1992) (DOD Report). Id., App. 0; Iraqi
Symposium, 15 S. ILL. L.J. 411 (1991); Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gu/fConjlict, 85 AJIL 452 (1991);
Symposium on IntcrnationalLaw and the Rules of War, 1991 DUKEJ. COMPo & INT'LL.l; which analyze international law
aspects of that war.
9. Accords on USSR withdrawal and other aspects of resolving that war include Agreement on Principles of
Mutual Relations, in Particular on Non-Interference & Non-Intervention, Apr. 14, 1988, Afghan.-Pak., 27 ILM 581
(1988); Declaration on International Guarantees, Apr. 14, 1988, USSR-US, id. 584; Agreement on Voluntary Return
ofRefugees, Apr. 14, 1988,Afghan-Pak.,id. 585; Agreement on Interrelationships for Settlement ofSituation Relating
to Afghanistan, with Annex, Apr. 14, 1988, Afghan.-US, id. 587. See HIRO 71, 73, 122, 162, 263 on relationships
between the Iran-Iraq war and the Soviet Afghanistan intervention.
10. Tousi, n. 1.30, 50.
11. Id.

12. Sec generally United States Diplomatic & Consular Staffin Iran (US V. Iran), 1979 ICJ 23,1980 id. 3 (Hostage
Case); CABLE 206; HIRO 1, 36-37, 71, 215-21, 223, 227, 231, 240, 263; nn. 282, 317, 326, 339 and accompanying texL
13. Islam's Shiite branch, State religion of Persia (later Iran) since 1506, has been a divisive force between Iran
and Iraq, once part of the Ottoman Empire, for centuries. For analysis of the interaction of the Shiite and Sunni sects
before and during the war, and Iran's role as a predominantly Gulf Shiite State, and other Gulf States, whose
popUlation are predominantly Sunni,seegenerallyCHuBIN &TRlPP ch. 9; PHtLIP MANSEL, CoNSTANTINOPLE: CITYOFTHE
WORLD'S DESIRE, 1453-1924, at 39, 189-90 (1996); Shireen Hunter, The Iran-Iraq War and Iran's Defense Policy, in Naff,
GULF SECURITY ch. 7 (effect on the military); Christopher C. Joyner, Introduction: The Geography and Geopolitics ofthe
Persian Gulf, in Joyner 1, 12-13; David Menashri, Iran: Doctrine and Reality, in KARSH 42-57; Hossein S. Seifzadeh,
Revolution, Ideology, and the War, in Rajaee, IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES 90-97; Robin Wright, The War and the Spread of
Islamic Fundamentalism, in KARSH 110-20; Neguin Yavari, National, Ethnic and Sectarian Issues in the War, in Rajaee,
IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES 75-89. As id.'s title suggests, most ofits chapters present an Iranian viewpoint that may seem at
variance with other views.
14. See generally HIRO passim.

IS. Sec generally Geneva Gas Protocol; US Renunciation of Certain Uses in War of Chemical Herbicides & Riot
Control Agents, Apr. 8, 1975, Exec. Order No. 11,850,40 Fed. Reg.16,187 (1975). See also Fourth Convention, arts.
3(1),13, amplified by Protocol!, arts. 1,48-52, 57, 59, and Protocol II, arts. 1, 4(2)(d), 13. The President of the United
States declined to recommend Protocol I for Senate advice and consent. Message from President of the United States
Transmitting the Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed Conflicts, Concluded at Geneva on June 10, 1977, Treaty Doc.
100-2, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., in 26 ILA1561 (1987). Over a third of the nations of the world, including NATO allies,
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had ratified one or both Protocols by the Tanker War's end. See SCHINDLER & TOMAN 701-03; RatificatIons and
Accessions to the Geneva Conventions and/or to the Additional Protocols bew:een 1.3 1988 and 30.6 1988, insert In
DISSEMINATION (No. 10, Sept. 1988). Many provisions are considered customary international law, e.g., prohibitions
against some reprisals. For analysis of the Gas Protocol, Fourth Convention and Protocol I in the Tanker War context,

see nn. VI.268-71, 281-99, 401-55 and accompanying texL
16. See generally David Holloway, Gorbachev's New Thinking, 68 FOR. AFF. 66 (No.1, 1939); Robert Levgold, The
Revolution in S01Jiet Foreign Policy, id. 82. Compare these views wilh Admiral C.A.H. Trost, US Chief of Naval
Operations, This Era and the Next: American Security Interests and the US Navy, address at Naval War College,
Newport, R.I., Jan. 10, 1989, typed release from US Navy Internal Relations Activity; and US Secretary of Defense
Frank C. Carlucci, Pre/ace to Soviet Military Power: An Assessment of the Threat 4, 5 (1988).
17. This multi-sided power structure in the ensuing discussion adds several countries to participants listed in
John E. Peterson, De/endingArabia: Evolution o/Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL ISSUES and PERSPECTIVES 117 (1980),
which, as its title indicates, is primarily concerned with Arabian peninsula issues.
18. Ahmad Naghibzadeh, Western Europe and the War, in Rajaee, IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES 39, 42, referring to
Exchange of Letters Respecting Recognition & Protection of an Arab State in Syria (Sykes-Picot Agreement), May
9/16,1916, Fr.-Gr. BriL, 221 CTS 323.
19. Iraq is a major oil producer with 100 billion barrels ofreserves. See generally Joyner, n.13, 8-9 for a geopolitical
sketch ofIraq at the end of the Tanker War; MAJID KHADDURI, SOCIALIST IRAQ: A STUDY IN IRAQI POLtTICS SINCE 1968
(1978) for internal Iraqi politics analysis in the decade before the war.
20. Iran is also a major oil producer, with 93 billion barrels in proven reserves and six refineries, including
Abadan, a 20-minute flight from Iraq. See generally Joyner, n.13, 7-8 for a geopolitical sketch ofIran at the end of the
Tanker War.
21. Charter Establishing Gulf Cooperation Council, Including Rules of Procedure & Unified Economic
Agreement, May 25 & Nov. 11, 1981,26ILM 1138 (1987)(GeC Charter) created the GCC. See also SIAII>Ih 706; William
Van Orden Gnitchel, The Arab States' Gulf Cooperation Council: Rules/or Trade and Industry, 20 INrI. LAW. 309 (1986);
Joseph A. Kechichian, The GulfCooperation Council and the Gulf War, in Joyner91; Nassibe G. Ziade,Introductory Notc,
in INTERNATIONAL ISSUES, n. 17, 11 (1980)(explaining GCC's genesis, development); Richard P. Johnson, Conquering
Fear in the Gulf, 115 PROCEEDINGS 78 (Mar. 1989) (analyzing GeC in action); Michael Sterner, The Gulf Coop,.,atlon
Council and Persian GuIfSecurity, in Naff, GULF SECURlTI' ch.1. GCC States line the Gulfwestern shore. For analysis of
the region's geography, see no. 66-69 and accompanying texL
22. The smallest of the Gulf States, the island nation of Bahrain has one of the largest oil refineries in the region
and considerable oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n. 13, at 11 for a geopolitical sketch of Bahrain at the end of the
Tanker War. Bahrain became independent in 1971. MAcDONALD 30.
23. Kuwait has significant oil reserves and offshore pumping facilities. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 9-10 for a
geopolitical sketch of Kuwait at the end ofthe Tanker War. Kuwait became independent in 1961. MAcDONALD 30.
24. Oman has significant oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n.13, 11-12fora geopolitica1sketch of Oman at the end
of the Tanker War. Oman has been independent since 1650. MAcDONALD 60 n.18.
25. Qatar has significant oil reserves. See generally Joyner, n. 13, 10 for a geopolitical sketch of Qatar at the end of
the Tanker War. Qatar became independent in 1971. MAcDONALD 30.
26. Saudi Arabia has a 10 million barrel per day pumping capacity and reserves estimated at 170 billion barrels,
the largest on Earth. See generally it!. 6-7 for a geopolitical sketch of Saudi Arabia at the end of the Tanker War.
27. Abu Dhabi has one ofthe richest oil areas on Earth; Dubai is a major world gold trader. Like many new States,
the UAE and neighboring Qatar have experienced internal instability. BURRELL & CoTTRELL, n. 7, 18-22;
MAcDONALD 30; Joyner, D. 13, 10-11.
28. Peterson, n. 17, 118-21.
29_ CABLE 179.
30. !d. 182.

31. It!. 189; see also MAcDONALD 33; James Stewart, East 0/ Suez, 92 PROCEEDINGS 40 (Mar. 1966). Kuwait was
admitted to the United Nations in 1963. Introductory Note, WELLENS 839, 841. The Arab League, or League of Arab
States, is governed by two treaties: Pact of League ofArab States, Mar. 22, 1945,70 UNTS 238; Treaty ofJoint Defence
& Economic Co-operation Between Arab States, with Military Annex,June 17, 1950, 157 BFSP 669, 48 AJIL SUI'I', 51
(1955). Thus the League can be seen as a regional self-defense organization under UN Charter, arL 51,and as 3 regional
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arrangement under Id., art. 52. See HUSSEIN A. HASSOUNA, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES AND REGIONAL DISPUTES ch. 1
(1975); MAJID KHADDURI, THE GULF WAR: THE ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQ.IRAN CONFLICT 140 (1988);
ROBERT W. MACDONALD, THE LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES (1965); SIMMA 701; Gerhard Bebr, Regional Organizations: A
United NatIons Problem, 49 AJIL 166, 181 (1955); Khadduri, 17re Arab League As a Regional Arrangement, 40 id. 756
(1946); nn. 111.800-17 and accompanying te.XL
32. Frank R. Barnett, Preface, in BURRELL & CoTTRELL, n. 7, V; see also MAcDONALD 28.
33. German or Italian relationships with area States have been less affected by historical considerations.
Naghibzadeh, n. 18,42.
34. CABLE 196.
35. BURRELL & COTTRELL, n. 7, 8-14.

36. Id. 14-15; see also n. 50 and accompanying text.
37. BURRELL & COTTRELL, n. 7, 15-16; AiAcDoNALD 33.
38. BURRELL & COTTRELL, n. 7, 22-30; AiAcDoNALD 150; Saidch Loman, Regional Powers and the War, in Rajaee,
IRANIAN PERSPECTIVES 13, 25. AiAcDoNALD 34-36 lists these among 38 territorial disputes and setdements in the
region, some of which have been cited previously. For analysis of agreements on continental shelf and other sea
boundaries, see Parts IV.B.2-IV.B.4, IV.D.2-IV.D.3.
39. BURRELL & CoTTRELL, n. 7, 37.
40. For years Middle East Force consisted of two overage destroyers and a seaplane tender or a transport as
flagship. Later more modern destroyers deployed.Id. 35-36. CENTCOM later e.xercised command over the much
larger and far more capable Joint Task Force Middle East UTFME). See nn. 77-80 and accompanying text.
41. The US return from investments in the area has been in the billions of dollars for years. BURRELL & CoTTRELL,
n. 7, 37; Pelerson, n. 17, 121-23; see also Peter W. DeForth, U.S. Naval Presence in the Persian Gulf: 17re Mideast Force
Since World IVar ll, 28 NWC REv. 28 (No.1, 1975).
42. Pelerson, n. 17,123; see also HIRo 14. The UK withdrawal was announced in 1968. Barnett, n. 32, v.
43. BURRELL & CoTTRELL, n. 7, 8, 31-33.
44. "Because many ruling families [in Gulf States other than Iraq] owe their power and position to England, one
should never overlook British influence." Naghibzadeh, n. 18,42.

45. See, e.g., nn. 37-38 and accompanying te.xt (Iran claims to Bahrain; Saudi claims to Abu Dhabi, Dhofar, Khufu
strip).
46. The agreement had a IS-year life with automatic renewal for 5-year increments unless one State notified the
other 12 months before the treaty e.xpired. Treaty of Friendship & Cooperation, Apr. IS, 1972, Iraq-USSR, art. 12, in
KUADDURI, n. 19,241,243. For further analysis of this and similar bilateral agreements of the Soviet Union, see nn.
111.289-302 and accompanying te.xt.
47. Iran's Shah was promised any but nuclear weapons. HIRo 15.
48. NAFF, IRAN-IRAQ WAR 62; Peterson, n.17, 125.
49. John Chipman, Europe and the Iran-Iraq War, in KARSH 215, 220.
50. International Border & Good Neighbourly Relations Treaty,June 13, 1975, Iran-Iraq, with Protocols, 14 ILM
1133 (1975). HIRO xii, 8-10, 17; Harry Post, Border Conflicts Between Iran and Iraq: Review and Legal Reflections, in
DeKKIiR& POSTch.1 (l992);Jalil Roshandel,Facts andAllegations: IraqiDisclaimerofthe 1975 Treaty, in Rajaee,IRANlAN
P£RSP£CTlVI:.S 98·103; and Ibraham Anvari Tehrani, IraqiAllitudes and Interpretation ofthe 1975 Agreement, in Rajaee,
IRAN.IRAQ WAR 11-23 analyze boundary disputes, diplomacy and the 1847, 1937 and 1975 treaties. See also Bennice L.
Liner,Iran and Iraq: An Overoiew, 32 NWCREv. 97 (No.4, 1984); Charles G. Macdonald,Regionalism and the Lawofthe
Sea: 17Ie Persian Gulf Perspective 73, 28 id. (No.5, 1980). These are longstanding disputes; they and religious
differences within Islam were sources of friction between the Ottoman Empire, which governed Iraq through World
War I, and Persia, now Iran, the Empire's principal enemy, down to today. HIRO 7-8, 21-33; MANSEL, n.13, 39,189-90.
51. BURRELL & CoTTRELL, n. 7, 16·18; CABLE 198; HIRO 14; see also nn. 31, 34and accompanying text. Iran said it
was "reslor[ing) its sovereignty" over the islands. Tehrani, n. 50, 12-13.
52. US Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger,A Repon to Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian
Gulf, June IS, 1987, in 26 ILM 1434, 1441-42 (1987); see also HIRO 72-74. T.B. Millar offered a more comprehensive
ralionale for what Soviet naval policy was designed to accomplish in the region:
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1. to be in a position to exercise effective influence over both ends of the Suez-Red Sea passage: this must
strengthen their strategic and diplomatic-negotiating position;
2. to replace the [UK] as the dominant external powerin the Arabian Peninsula and .•• Gulfarea: the Western
oil companies and half of the West's oil supplies are then in a measure hostages to Soviet political and economic
policies;
3. under Soviet "protection," to foster self-defense and cooperative defense against China in India and
Southeast Asia;
4. to obtain positions of political and military strength throughout the .•. region, ••. to e:-,:ercise control over
sea routes between the western and eastern Soviet Union, and to be able to influence the policies oflocal governments
toward Soviet ends in a crisis or at other times of decision;
5. to provide arms to local governments to foster these ends, and to weaken or destroy the influence of
competitive powers or ideologies;
6. to keep watch on [US] naval activities, especially Polaris submarines; and
7. to ensure increased access to certain raw materials, to trade extensively and profitably within the region,
and to use trade for political ends if the occasion arises.
T.B. MILLAR, SOVIET POLICIES INTHE INDIAN OCEAN AREA 6 (1970), quoted in BURRELL & CoITRELL, n. 7, 34-35. Sec also
Joyner,n.B, B;JamesT. Westwood, TheSuviet UnionandtheSouthemSeaRoute, 35 NWCREv. 54,63 (No. 1, 1982).
53. Barnett, n. 32, v; see also nn. 42-45 and accompanying texL
54. Kazem Sajjadpour, The USSR and the War, in Rajaee, IRANIAN PERSPECilVES 29-30, referring to Treaty of
Friendship & Co-Operation, n. 46.
55. This had been true for over 10 years. Compare BURRELL & CoITREl!., n. 7, 4 with Naghibzadeh, n.18, 40.
56. ELSTON WHITE, NATURAL AND ENERGY RESOURCES 104-12 (1985). Japanese dependence stood at 90 percent in
the Seventies. BURRELL & COITREL!., n. 7,4.
57. Ralph A. Cossa,America's Interests in the Persian GulfAre Growing, Not Decreasing, ARMED FORCESJ. INT'L 58
Uune 1987); these figures are consistent with those for the Seventies. See generally BURRELL & COITRELL, n. 7, 3-5.
58. Naghibzadeh, n. 18,43.
59. CLINTON H. WHITEHURST, JR., THE U.S. MERCHANT MARINE: IN SEARCH OF AN ENDURING POLICY 72 (1986);
Joyner, n. 13,5.

60. See generally ROBERT E. MCCLEAVE, TRANSPORTATION 19-29 (1986); WHITEHURST, U.S. MERCHANT MARINE, n.
59,225. BOLESLAW A. BOCZEK, FLAGS OF CONVENIENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDY (1962); RODNEY CARLISLE,
SOVEREIGNTY FOR SALE: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE PANAMANIAN AND LIBERIAN FL.\GS OF CONVENIENCE (1981)
analyze development of flags of convenience; see also ERNST G. FRANKEL, REGULATION AND POLICIES Of AMIiRiCAN
SHIPPING 74-77 (1982); SAMUEL A. LAWRENCE, UNITED STATES MERCHANT SHIPPING: POLICtES AND POLITICS 101-04,
182-89 (1966), WHITEHURST, ch. 18; Frank L. Wiswall, Jr., Flags 0/ Convenience, ch. 4 in UNITED STATES SHIPPING
POLICIES AND THE WORLD MARKET (William A. Lovett ed. 1996). WHITEHURST and id., THE U.S. SHIPBUILDING
INDUSTRY: P AST,PRESENT AND FUTURE (1983) are recent studies ofthe US merchant marine, elaborating on MCClEAVB'S
analysis.
61. See generally Annex III: Merchant Ships of the World: Ships of 500 grt & Above As of I July 1985, in
Convention on Conditions for Registration of Ships, Feb. 7, 1986,26 ILM 1229, 1246-50 (1987) (Ship Registration
Convention). However, the Soviet surge was on a cusp of general decline. See N. Shashnikar, World Shipping
Competition, ch. 3 in UNITED STATES SHIPPING POLICIES, n. 60, 67, 74-76.

62. The Conference "had a great influence for later deliberations on the protection and preservation of the marine
environment" in UN Committees and in LOS Convention drafting. Introduction, '!I XII.ll, in 4 Nordquist 8-9; see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), Part VI, Introductory Note, at 99; id., § 602 r.n.l; see also BIRNIE & BOYLE 39-53; Carol Annette
Petsonik, The Role o/the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) in the Development o/International Law, 5 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 351 (1990).
63. Kuwait Regional Convention for Co-operation on Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution,
Apr. 24, 1978, 1140 UNTS 133 (Kuwait Regional Convention); Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating
Pollution by Oil & Other Harmful Substances in Case of Emergency, Apr. 24, 1978, id. 201 (Kuwait Protocol),
analyzed in Parts IV.A.2, VI.B.2.a, VI.B.2.c(I), VI.B.2.c(IIl).
64. BOWMAN & HARRIS 295 (11th Cum. Supp. 1995).
65. MACDONALD 79. Chapter IV analyzes the Tanker War in the LOS context; Chapter VI considers maritime
environmental issues.

The War, 1980--88

83

66. The Liberty Ships of World War II displaced 5,000 to 10,000 tons. Modern aircraft carriers displace 80,000
tons and require over 75 feet of water to navigate safely.

67. Sec also n. 51 and accompanying texL
68. The industry declined after World War II when cultured pearls entered the market; 75,000peariers once plied
their trade in Gulf offshore waters. BURRELL & COTTRELL, n. 7, 1.
69. MACDoNALD 25-26, 78-79,165-66, publishing maps, and Joyner, n. 13,2-4, also publishing a map, supplied
material for the foregoing; see also nn. 36, 50, 85, 86, 89, 100, 153-56,489 and accompanying tel(L
70. Cossa, n. 57,58-59.
71. Gioia, Commentary, n. 7, 57.
72. MACDoNALD 78; Eliyahu Kanovsky,EeonomicImplicalionsfor the Region and World Oil Markel, in KARSH 231,
249.
73. More than 60 a day passed through Hormuz during the early Seventies. BURRELL & COTTRELL, n. 7, 9; Joyner,
n. 13, 4. Tanker traffic declined by the war's end. Kanovsky, n. 72, 249; see also n. 524 and accompanying texL
MACDoNALD'S estimate for 1968 of one tanker every 15 minutes seems high, unless he means passage during daylight
hours only.
74. S.P. Menefee, Commentary, in DE GUITRY & RONZtTTI 99, 100.
75. President Jimmy Carter,Stale ofthe Union Address, Jan. 23, 1980, 1 Public Papers: Carter 1980-81, at 194, 197
(1981); NAFF, IRAN-IRAQ WAR 64. On July 19, 1979, responding to statements by Palestine Liberation Organization
supporters, the US State Department had issued a warning to oil tanker crews and other vessels to be alert for attempts
by terrorists to seize or sink a ship in the Persian Gulf. In August 1979 Lloyd's of London had announced that special
war-zone insurance would be required for tankers traveling through the Gulf. There was also the possibility that a
terrorist attack might occur in the Strait. MACDONALD 165.
76. Two carrier task forces were on station at various points during the nc.xt year. CABLE 205-06; Harold H.
Saunders, The Iran-Iraq W~r: Implicalions for US Policy, in Naff, GULF SECURITY 59, 64; see also nn. 39-49 and
accompanying tC.XL
77. Diego Garcia development began in 1979, along with agreements between the United States and Egypt,
Kenya, Oman and Somalia to permit US access to facilities in those countries. See, e.g., Agreement Concerning
Availability of Certain Indian Ocean Islands for Defense Purposes of Both Governments, Dec. 30, 1966, US-UK, 18
UST 28, 603 UNTS 273; Agreement Concerning Privileges & Immunities of US Military and Related Personnel in
Egypt, July 26,1981, 33 UST 3353; NAFF, IRAN-IRAQ WAR 63-64; Saunders, n. 76, at 63. In 1986 the United Kingdom
and the United States concluded a more specific agreement on Diego Garcia. Agreement Concerning US Naval
Support Facility on Diego Garcia, Feb. 25, 1976, UK-US,27 UST 315,1018 UNTS 372 (Diego Garcia Agreement); see
n. 302 and accompanying tC.XL In late 1978 the U.S.S. Conslellalion carrier task force had sailed for waters off Iran to
manifest US concern for the chaos in Iran, but the order was cancelled a few days later after USSR protests of "gunboat
diplomacy," The result was damage to US prestige. In March 1979 two battle groups were sent to the Arabian Sea after
the Hostage Crisis. See n.76. The latter was reminiscent of an earlier manifestation of presence in 1974.ld. 201. In
April 1980 U.S.S. Nimitz launched helicopters in the Arabian Sea in a failed attempt to rescue US Embassy hostages in
Teheran.ld. 206. For a juridical account of the crisis,see generally Hostage Case, n. 12; see also n. 12 and accompanying
texL UK relations with Iran were then cool and a little better with Iraq. A.V. Lowe, Commentary, in DE GUTTRY &
RONZlTTl 241, 242-43. The United States had lacked formal diplomatic representation in Baghdad since 1967.
However, diplomatic contact with Iran and Iraq proceeded in third country capitals or in the United Nations. HtRO 71.
78. At the time RDJTF was more of a tripwire to demonstrate to the USSR that the United States was prepared to
respond on a global basis if threats to the region developed. The projection was for facilities for four or five divisions
(80,000-100,000 troops) to be ordered to the region within a month. Seven ships were initially senL WHITEHURST, U.S.
MERCIIANT MARINE, n. 59, at 121-22; Thomas L. McNaugher, U.S. Policy and lhe Gulf War: A Queslion of Means, in
Joyner 111, 112; Saunders, n. 76, 65-66. See also Part lV.CA.
79. RDJTFwas often erroneously known as the RDF or Rapid Deployment Force. Maxwell OrmeJohnson, The

Role of U.S. Mililary Force in lhe Gulf War, in Joyner 127, 129-30.
80. Within two weeks after outbreak of the war four US Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS)
aircraft were dispatched to Saudi Arabia; they were later sold to the Saudis as the GeC moved from a posture of
internal security cooperation to economic and defense security posture. HtRO 75; SIIoIIoI,\ 706; Lotfian, n. 38, 19;
Saunders, n. 76, 69. See also nn. 172,261 and accompanying text. US-built Saudi facilities were designed to allow
handling US forces "should the Saudis feel in the future that their security required deployment of US forces."
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Saunders 63. This precaution may have been useful during the 1980-88 war but was a godsend during the 1990-91 war.

See A. Reza Sheikholeslami,SaudiArabia and the United States: Pannership in the PersIan Gulf, in Rajaee, lRAN.lRAQ W.\R
103-22 for a highly critical, and occasionally less than balanced, account ofSaudi-US relations during the Tanker War.

81. See generally John Devlin, Iraqi Military Policy: From Asseniveness to Defense, .n Naff, GULF SECURITY 129-39;
Keith McLachlan, Analyses of the Risks of War: Iran-Iraq Discord, 1979-1980, in Rajaee, IRJlN.IR.\Q WAR 24-31.
82. For analysis ofIraqi waraims,see PhebeMarr, The Iran-Iraq War: The Viewfrom Iraq, in Joyner 59. For analysis
of phases oflran's war aims, see Eric Hooglund, Stralegic and Polilical Objeclives in the GlIlflV'ar: Iran's View, In id. 39.
Iran and Iraq did not end diplomatic relations until October 1987, during the war's seventh year. CHUBIN & TRIPI' 252.
See also n. 409 and accompanying text.
83. HIRO 35-39, 75-76; Lotfian, n. 38, 14-16; Itamar Rabinovich, The Impacl on lhe Arab World, in K,\RSH 101,
102-03.
84. The UK position in 1980-88 was that Iran and Iraq were in a "conflict," not a war, and that States' rights and
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